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CLIENT-CENTEREDNESS MULTIPLIED: INDIVIDUAL
AUTONOMY AND COLLECTIVE MOBILIZATION IN
PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERS' REPRESENTATION
OF GROUPS
Stephen Ellmann*
INTRODUCTIONN major current of contemporary legal scholarship urges us to
ediscover the virtues of groups. The republican citizen finds
honor and responsibility through engaging in the public life of her
society.' The isolated victim of discrimination and entrenched power
finds new hope of resistance in struggling alongside others who share
the same experiences.' The partisan puts aside demagoguery in favor
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. I am grateful to many people who
have made helpful comments about this project, including the participants in Columbia's
Clinical Theory Workshop and in the New England clinical teachers' workshop, at both of
which I presented an earlier draft of this paper, as well as the faculties of several other law
schools at which I discussed these issues. I particularly appreciate the assistance of Robert
Amdur, Sue Bryant, Bob Dinerstein, Lucas Guttentag, Heather Hanson, John Leubsdorf,
Carol Liebman, James Liebman, Peter Margulies, Thomas Pak, Stephen Pepper, Harriet
Rabb, Nancy Rosenbloom, Barbara Schatz, Thomas Shaffer, Jane Spinak, and Judith Whiting.
Beth Levine and Susan Widule provided valuable research assistance, and Elizabeth Martin
deciphered and transcribed interview tapes. Columbia Law School, where I was teaching
during the writing of this Article, gave financial support.
I See, e.g., David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 329-37 (1988) (articulating
the moral prizes-and prices--of "mutual political commitment"); Michael J. Sandel,
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 179, 183 (1982) (arguing for recognition of the
constitutive role of community in our very identities, and for an engagement with each other
that may enable us to "know a good in common that we cannot know alone"); Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988) (tempering republicanism's potential
authoritarianism through a vision of the incorporation of "hitherto excluded" voices in a
noncoercive, dialogic process of interaction and influence); James S. Liebman, Desegregating
Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1463, 1552-65 (1990)
(urging recognition of a republican responsibility of every citizen to accord "equal respect" to
all other people); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539 (1988)
(articulating an understanding of "liberal republicanism," in which "political liberty" resides
"in collective self-determination" based on attention to diverse perspectives and "public-
regarding justifications" for choosing between them).
2 See, e.g., Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 Yale L.J. 1049, 1053 (1970)
(asserting that the appropriate aim of poverty law is "helping poor people to organize
themselves" and that traditional practice "hurts poor people by isolating them from each
other"); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for
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of membership in a dialogic community. The moral reasoner who
recognizes the web of connection between herself and others reaches
results more humane than those generated from rigidly individualistic
premises;4 so, too, does the person who understands how profoundly
she has been shaped as a person by the communities of which she has
been a part.5 Haunting these visions, however, is a recurrent con-
cern-that the individual will be lost within a community suddenly all
too solidary.
This Article examines the conflicts between the themes of group
participation and individual autonomy in the context of public inter-
est lawyers' representation of groups. This is a critical area of legal
practice, but one that neither current rules of legal ethics nor current
models of lawyer-client interaction adequately illuminate. Indeed, the
reader of the codes of legal ethics might be forgiven for assuming that
most legal work is done on behalf of individuals. The Model Code of
Professional Responsibility explains the fundamental duty of zealous
representation as a consequence of the proposition that "[iln our gov-
ernment of laws and not of men, each member of our society is enti-
tled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the
law ......6 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, now a model
for the ethical codes of most states, expressly regulate the conduct of
Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 535, 538 (1987-88) (suggesting that
litigation can be an occasion for "participatory, educative [and empowering] experiences for
clients and their advocates"); cf. Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2143-45 (1991) (maintaining that
the image of poor clients as "dependent" can be overcome through such steps as the
organization and involvement of "client community support groups").
3 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980) (exploring the
justifications for, and the implications of, "neutral dialogue"); Joel F. Handler, Dependent
People, the State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35
UCLA L. Rev. 999, 1001 (1988) (exploring the possibility of dialogic community in
relationships that are "at least initially, characterized by great disparities in power").
4 See, e.g., Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development 25-39 (1982); Paul J. Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in
the Law School Curriculum: The Logic of Jake's Ladder in the Context of Amy's Web, 38 J.
Legal Educ. 243 (1988).
5 See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, Autonomy, Community, and Lawyers' Ethics, 19 Cap. U. L.
Rev. 939 (1990) (exploring the compatibility of "communitarian morality" and respect for
individual autonomy in the context of legal ethics); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of
Radical Individualism, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 963, 965-66 (1987) (arguing for the critical importance
to legal ethics of a recognition that "organic communities... are prior in life and in culture to
individuals").
6 Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-1 (1980) [hereinafter Model Code].
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lawyers who represent organizational clients-but only in a single
rule.
7
In fact, however, a tremendous amount of what lawyers do they do
for groups of people.8 The vast bulk of corporate representation is in
a sense the representation of the many individual owners of the corpo-
ration's stock. Union representation is, probably a good deal more
directly, representation of the union's members. Class action litiga-
tion expressly deals with the interests of groups of individuals who
share common concerns but are too numerous to be individually rep-
resented, and the members of many smaller groups are individually
named in the cases that concern them. There remain, to be sure,
many cases or matters in which the only formal client is an individual,
but few of these will implicate only that individual's interests. A sin-
gle child may demand the desegregation of a school system; one
homeless family's vindication of a right to emergency housing may
help others win the same benefit in the future; and the gains and losses
from any transaction or litigation are likely to be reaped not only by
the "client" but by the client's family.
For lawyers whose work is aimed at achieving social reform on
behalf of people who would otherwise lack adequate representation-
those lawyers whom I will call "public interest lawyers"9-the role of
groups is particularly significant. Faced with needs far greater than
7 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 (1983) (as amended through February,
1990) [hereinafter Model Rules]. According to Stephen Gillers and Roy D. Simon, Jr.,
"approximately 35 states have adopted some form of the Model Rules." Stephen Gillers &
Roy D. Simon, Jr., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards-With Recent Supreme
Court Decisions 3 (1991):
8 John Leubsdorf has recently observed that "[i]n reality, legal services today are usually
rendered by groups of people for other groups of people, or perhaps by organizations for other
organizations." John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 Cornell L.
Rev. 825, 825 (1992).
9 My definition of "public interest lawyers" resembles that of the Council for Public Interest
Law, which defines "public interest law" as "efforts to provide legal representation to
previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts," the Council continues, "have
been undertaken in recognition that the ordinary marketplace for legal services fails to provide
such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests ...
includ[ing] the poor, environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities, and others."
Council for Pub. Interest Law, Balancing the Scales of Justice: Financing Public Interest Law
in America 6-7 (1976). Like the Council, see id. at 7, I include in this definition the work of
legal services lawyers whose caseloads may consist entirely of individual client-service work.
These cases may not seek law reform directly, but I take their underlying rationale to be, at
least in part, a redistribution and thus a reform of legal power within society.
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they can hope to meet, 10 these lawyers must make decisions about
what cases and causes to undertake. The problems their clients
encounter are not the product of some series of unique individual
accidents; rather, they result at least in part from social conditions
that affect many people at once. Meaningful assistance to these cli-
ents depends, to some extent, on finding legal strategies that target
broad situations rather than just individual circumstance, and public
interest lawyers can properly make case selection decisions that take
into account whether potential cases will have this broad impact."
The success of these strategies, in turn, may depend on the extent to
which they empower clients outside as well as inside the courts, and
so may hinge on the degree to which they transform this multiplicity
of people into a group.
The upshot is that a great deal of what public interest lawyers do
will be done on behalf of groups, either explicitly or implicitly. But
the various groups of disadvantaged or underrepresented people in
our society are not monolithic. They consist of individuals, whose
needs may in fact be unique and whose relations to the groups to
which they may be said to belong may range from hostile to harmoni-
ous. 12 Poor people, like rich people, are formed in and are part of
communities. However, they equally may seek to change or even to
shed some of the ties that bind them to these communities. Thus
there is an inevitable danger that the lawyer who sets out to help dis-
advantaged people as members of groups may inadvertently succeed
in oppressing them (or some of them) as individuals. So long as we
acknowledge and value the capacity of individuals to make choices
that are not entirely dictated by their preexisting group affiliations-
in other words, so long as we value individual autonomy-we must be
troubled by the danger to this autonomy inherent in a focus on group
interests. My purpose in this Article is to examine the extent of this
danger in certain forms of public interest lawyers' representation of
client groups. I will argue that proper representation of groups
10 Luban, supra note 1, at 241-42; see Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to
Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 337,
342 & n.26 (1978).
1 So David Luban has argued, and I agree. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in
a Flawed Democracy, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 116, 174 (1990) (reviewing Luban, supra note 1).




demands radical alterations in our usual methods of protecting indi-
vidual client autonomy in the lawyer-client relationship, but that it is
possible for lawyers both to limit the intrusions on individual auton-
omy that group interactions generate and to protect a crucial element
of individual autonomy--our choices to make connections-that
would be jeopardized by a resistance to group representation.
It might be objected that this inquiry is misdirected from the start,
precisely because it rests on an assertion of the importance of individ-
ual autonomy. I do make this assertion, but I do so in a particular
way, which needs explanation here. I begin from the proposition that
it is impossible for us to know how to weigh the value of individual
autonomy against that of group connection.1 3 Thomas Shaffer argues
forcefully for the importance of connection on the ground that the
crucial determinants of our moral natures are the families and com-
munities into which we are born.14 Shaffer takes this account of how
we come to personhood as an argument for giving less salience to
choice as a moral dimension because, he says, we do not choose these
birth communities.15 This sounds reasonable, but actually is unprov-
able once we step outside the bounds of Shaffer's Judeo-Christian per-
spective. The Buddhist doctrine of karma (and perhaps other
religious teachings as well) suggest that we choose, or rather earn, our
parents as part of the cycle of birth and rebirth. 6
Even if we make the conventional Western assumption that we are
not responsible for the parental and social forces that shape us as we
grow, it does not follow that individual autonomy is unimportant. As
Stephen Pepper has thoughtfully suggested in response to Shaffer's
argument, each of us has a history not only of being shaped by groups
but of forming new ones and leaving or distancing ourselves from
13 Thus I agree with Frank Michelman when he says, "I do not know what is good for the
soul." Michelman, supra note 1, at 1504.
14 Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics After Babel, 19 Cap. U. L. Rev. 989 (1990).
Psychological and sociological theories both offer support for Shaffer's description.
15 Shaffer maintains that "[wie are primarily members, not choosers. We are primarily
connected, not alone." Id. at 1001-02.
16 Thus Nichiren Daishonin, the Japanese monk revered as the original Buddha by devout
members of Nichiren Shoshu (a Buddhist sect now found in many countries around the
world), wrote in the thirteenth century to a follower, "It must be ties of karma from the distant
past that have destined you to become my disciple at a time like this .... The [Lotus] sutra's
statement, 'In lifetime after lifetime they were always born together with their masters in the
Buddha lands throughout the universe,' cannot be false in any way." 1 The Major Writings of
Nichiren Daishonin 24 (The Gosho Translation Comm. ed.-trans., 1979).
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some of the attachments we formerly accepted or sought out.17 This
history, moreover, does not begin at some singular moment that fol-
lows our having been fully shaped by forces beyond our control; we
begin shaping, as well as being shaped, early in our lives. Although
many of the choices we make may be unwise or immoral, making
choices is obviously central to our efforts to create moral value for our
lives.
18
That we are inescapably uncertain about the relative values of
autonomy and community counsels against radically devaluing either
one-a counsel this Article takes seriously. If lawyer-client relations
can be shaped that provide effective representation of client groups
and also secure real protection for the autonomy of those groups'
members, these relationships are to be welcomed precisely because
they do respect both sets of values. As I will argue, in some contexts
such relationships are indeed within lawyers' reach. 19
But even if lawyers can simultaneously provide some degree of pro-
tection to individual autonomy and the community of a client group,
17 For Pepper's discussion of our roots in communities and our prerogatives of choice, see
Pepper, supra note 5, at 950-57.
18 Luban has recently argued that autonomy has "no intrinsic value." David Luban,
Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen
Ellmann, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1004, 1037 (1990). As indicated in the text, I view autonomy as
an important human good-but in a sense Luban may not disagree. The argument he develops
actually suggests a great deal of what may be called "extrinsic" value for autonomy, which
Luban agrees is "closely connected with important values," including moral responsibility,
creativity, individuality, and, perhaps most important for present purposes, the principle that
one person should not be able to subordinate another. Id. at 1035-43. Though he argues that
few lawyers for "paying customers" ever succeed in subordinating their clients to the lawyers'
moral views, he observes that "troubling issues of subordination arise" in a number of
contexts, many of them falling in the field of public interest law. Id. at 1036-37 & n.l 12.
Whatever the "intrinsic value" of autonomy, therefore, Luban apparently would recognize its
practical significance at least in parts of this domain of practice.
19 In other circumstances, however, lawyers will not be able to accommodate so fully the
claims of both autonomy and community. The lawyer for a class of thousands or even millions
will never be able to have any contact at all with many of the people she represents, much less
to give each of them a meaningful voice in the conduct and outcome of the litigation. Those
within the represented class may be quite unaware of what is being done on their behalf, and
without power to opt out of the process if they do learn of it. Abram Chayes has commented
on the "inevitable incompleteness of the interest representation" in what he calls "public law
litigation," though he by no means endorses indifference to the interests of those affected by
such litigation; on the contrary, he is concerned to encourage more rather than less complete
representation of these interests. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1310-13 (1976). There is good reason to doubt, however,
how complete the spectrum of interests represented in such cases has actually been. See
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it might be argued that as an ethical matter, they should not. Honor-
ing both concerns may be good, the argument would go, but deci-
sively favoring one over the other would be better. Perhaps lawyers
could provide more effective representation of client groups if they
gave less protection to individual members. Conversely, perhaps they
could better protect individual members if they curtailed to some
extent the services they provide to groups.
No algorithm exists by which to resolve such conflicts mathemati-
cally, and no escape hatch permits us to avoid them. If we have good
reason to acknowledge the value of both autonomy and connection in
our moral lives, however, then it makes sense to question a calculus
which operates to privilege one set of claims so sharply over the other.
Moreover, we have ample grounds for denying that these two values
are necessarily opposed. Rather, as I will argue later, people's
involvement in groups can both protect and express their autonomy;
and at the same time, groups that respect their members' autonomy
may draw strength from that very feature of their make-up. 20 In the
many cases where considerations of autonomy and community coin-
cide, only a method of representation that honors both will succeed in
honoring either.
The case for the compatibility of autonomy and community in law-
yers' representation of clients, like the case for the compatibility of
wisdom and freedom in democratic self-government, remains in part
an aspiration and even an experiment, rather than a descriptive fact.
To the extent that this experiment fails, and autonomy and connec-
tion prove incompatible, I find the claims for autonomy, for a sphere
of freedom and choice that each of us can enjoy despite others' desires
to encroach on it, very powerful. This Article pursues the aspiration
of harmonizing these two values, however, by seeking to identify the
steps lawyers can take to represent certain client groups in ways that
generally Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1183 (1982)
(examining a range of problems on this score).
It is no part of my thesis to challenge the propriety of such litigation, even though it
drastically curtails the client prerogatives that the rules of professional ethics see as bound up
with individual autonomy. In truth, such cases often may not sharply pose the choice between
group and individual interests, because such litigation may well be the only way to secure the
class members' legal rights. In this context, a process that invades client autonomy by
depriving class members of control over their case may be essential to winning for these same
clients benefits that they can then use to enhance their autonomy.
20 See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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will foster both group connection and individual autonomy. I will
begin by looking closely, in Part I, at the rules of ethics and of law
that govern whether the lawyer's relationship with a set of people will
be seen as the representation of multiple individuals or of a unitary
group. As we will find, the relevant rules are surprisingly open, and
in fact permit-even compel-lawyers in a wide range of situations to
assess whether their client is, or should be, a group, a set of individu-
als, or only a single person. Moreover, the choice is a fateful one, for
the consequences of adopting one or another of the possible character-
izations include sharp variations in the nature of the lawyer's duties of
loyalty and confidentiality.
Given the reality of group representation in our law, it becomes all
the more important to determine how to make such representation
compatible with individual autonomy. I will argue in Part II that
lawyers who seek to separate individual group members from their
groups in adherence to a model of individual representation disserve
these individuals' choices and status as group members, and thereby
actually harm individual autonomy. It follows, then, that lawyers
should recognize groups as their clients, and counsel them as such. In
doing so, as I will suggest in Part III, lawyers can appropriately find
guidance in the aspirations and the techniques of "client-centered"
practice with individuals. Counseling a group, however, is not the
same as counseling the individual members of the group, separately
and in succession, and somehow computing the sum of the individu-
als' preferences so as to obtain the judgment of the group as a whole.
Groups that are making their own decisions do so as groups, through
one structure or another that gives voice to the members' mutual
interaction, discussion and debate, and lawyers who seek to counsel
such groups will need to participate in, or at least affect, the decision-
making processes that characterize group action.
To say whether such representation can be squared with a continu-
ing respect for individual autonomy, however, requires an examina-
tion of how this engagement with the group's decisiomaking will in
fact work. This is an immense question, and one that has been far
from completely explored. It is the focus of Part IV, in which I will
examine the counseling relationship between lawyers and groups, and
in particular between lawyers and groups that are small enough so
that the lawyer could conceivably speak to all of the members, not
necessarily one by one, but at least in a community meeting hall.
1110 [Vol. 78:1103
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With groups of this size, it is possible for lawyers to take direction
from their clients, rather than undertaking the responsibility for
choice largely on their own as they might in a vast class action. Tak-
ing direction from one's clients is, of course, the ideal of client-cen-
tered practice. As we explore the nature of "group client-
centeredness," however, we will see that the careful elucidation of an
individual client's thoughts, concerns and choices that characterizes
client-centered practice on a one-to-one basis must be altered quite
dramatically if the lawyer is to assist in the process of group
decisionmaking.
For lawyers seeking to bring about social reform, moreover, work-
ing with groups presents an opportunity less evident in individual case
work-an opportunity to empower clients by helping them to realize
their collective capacity as political actors. Although lawyers may
win political victories for their clients in a variety of ways-for exam-
ple, by lobbying in the legislature or by winning media attention
focused on a lawsuit-the path offering perhaps the greatest potential
for the enhancement and subjugation of individual autonomy is one in
which the lawyer seeks to foster a political mobilization of the clients
themselves. The idea of the lawyer as mobilizer seems far distant
from the careful restraints of client-centered individual practice, but I
will argue in the final Part of this Article that lawyers can still fashion
a "group client-centered" role with this political aspiration, a role in
which they protect individual autonomy while at the same time ren-
dering real service to collective mobilization.
I. THE DEFINITION OF THE CLIENT
A. Four Frameworks for Representation
Defining the client is often difficult, even when only one person is
being represented. In individual representation, the lawyer's task, and
the client's, is to ensure that the lawyer comes to understand this par-
ticular client as he or she is, and not as the lawyer finds it natural, or
convenient, or attractive to imagine the client to be. This is no easy
matter, particularly for lawyers who are overburdened by caseload
and look to routinized systems of legal triage for relief.21 Even law-
21 See Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2110-13, 2123-25; Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care About
What Happened, We Only Care About What is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations
of Reality, 26 Soc. Probs. 599 (1979).
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yers who want to provide individualized service are in danger of mis-
reading their clients, for the ways that clients describe themselves are
inevitably influenced by the questions they are asked, and the desires
clients articulate are affected by the sense of the possible that lawyers
provide."2 These effects, moreover, are not merely a matter of self-
presentation, because clients, like the rest of us, change in response to
what they experience, so that what the lawyer says to the client may
affect who a client is.
Whatever the intricacies of defining the individual client, matters
are vastly more complex when the lawyer is dealing with more than
one individual. Consider the following situation:
Eight tenants from a particular apartment building meet with a law-
yer at the local legal services office. The tenants explain that they,
and the forty other families in the building, have struggled for years
to make their landlord provide them with a minimally safe and habit-
able building. Many of them have, as individuals, protested to the
landlord; some have temporarily withheld their rent; and some have
moved out when they could. Now, however, these eight men and
women have decided that conditions in their building are intolerable,
and that they want to take action together to seek redress. In the
course of the meeting, it becomes clear to the lawyer that although
most of these eight people are quite determined to continue living in
the building, two or three might be tempted to take a cash settlement
that would enable them to find better housing elsewhere-even
though their doing so might jeopardize the chance of the other ten-
ants' obtaining needed repairs. The lawyer agrees to help them for-
mulate and carry out a plan of attack that will put the maximum legal
pressure on the landlord to accede to the tenants' demands.
This lawyer might characterize her relationship to the tenants in
any of four quite different ways. These different characterizations, as
we shall see, span a continuum from an insistence on the status of
each individual as a client to a vision of these individuals, and their
many other co-tenants, as a class. The consequences of these charac-
terizations, not surprisingly, can powerfully affect the work the law-
yer does for the tenants, and the relations the tenants will have with
each other. Where individual representation is the model, the lawyer
must assiduously work for each individual client, but may well have
22 See Gary Bellow & Bea Moulton, The Lawyering Process: Materials for Clinical
Instruction in Advocacy 233-34 (1978); Simon, supra note 12, at 476-77.
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to withdraw altogether if the clients develop conflicts of interest. In
group representation, on the other hand, the lawyer's fidelity to each
individual is considerably curtailed, but her ability to help the individ-
uals to achieve their collective ends is enhanced. These points will
become more clear as we examine each of the four possible
characterizations.
L Individual Representation, Multiplied
First, a lawyer might see herself as representing eight separate indi-
viduals. This, of course, would be ethically unproblematic if the eight
had identical interests, but they do not. Instead, after the first meet-
ing it is already apparent that the tenants may eventually have quite
different preferences as to the remedies they seek, and that these dif-
ferent preferences might result in sharp disagreements within the
group. Under the Model Rules, however, "a possible conflict" does
not necessarily bar the lawyer from representing all eight.23 If the
lawyer reasonably believes, in light of her experience with such cases,
that the tenants will ultimately agree on the issue of relief, or that
each will be able to get his or her preferred relief without undercut-
ting the others' positions vis-A-vis the landlord-and if the clients con-
sent to her representing them all despite the possibility of future
conflict-then she is free to do so.24 Each tenant will then be her
client, and she will owe a duty of loyalty and confidentiality to each
one as an individual.25 If a true conflict of interest does emerge, then
she may well have to withdraw from the representation of all eight,
whatever the difficulties they may face in finding alternative counsel.26
23 Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.7 cmt.
24 Id. Rule 1.7. The lawyer might also be able to minimize the risk of a fatal conflict of
interest by "limit[ing] the objectives of the representation," id. Rule 1.2(c), provided each
client consents. The narrower the scope of the representation, the more likely it will be that
disagreements among the clients will not create a conflict of interest bearing on the particular
objectives for which this lawyer is responsible.
25 See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 7.1.3 (Student ed. 1986)
(discussing the loyalty and confidentiality principles that underlie the conflict rules).
26 Under the Model Rules a lawyer is barred from representing anyone whose interests are
"materially adverse" to those of any client she had previously represented in "the same or a
substantially related matter," absent the former client's consent. Model Rules, supra note 7,
Rule 1.9(a). Though the Model Code, supra note 6, contains no specific prohibition to the
same effect, a similar result has "not uncommon[ly]" been reached under it. Wolfram, supra
note 25, § 7.4, at 363-64.
1992] 1113
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2. Intermediation
Not every disagreement ripens into a conflict of interest, however,
and if disagreement among the tenants on the issue of relief does
develop, the lawyer can continue to represent all eight if she can char-
acterize her relationship to the tenants in a second way-as a media-
tor or, in the language of the Model Rules, an "intermediary." 27
Under this rubric, the lawyer is free to help the clients to reach a
compromise that is in their collective best interest, rather than vigor-
ously defending each individual's preexisting preferences. However,
the lawyer can play the role of intermediary only in rather narrow
circumstances. Each client must consent, after consultation, to the
lawyer's playing of this part-and if any of the clients revoke their
consent she must withdraw.28 In addition, she herself must
reasonably believe[ ] that the matter can be resolved on terms com-
patible with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to
make adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is
little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if
the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful ....29
These conditions are not easily met.30 The lawyer is obliged to pro-
tect each client's confidentiality and to keep each client adequately
informed, and these duties can be directly at odds:31 the more any
client insists on confidentiality, the harder it will be for the lawyer to
27 Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 2.2. Mediation is also recognized as a lawyering role by
the Model Code, supra note 6, EC 5-20, although it is not the specific focus of any of the
Code's Disciplinary Rules.
28 Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 2.2(a)(1), (c); see also infra note 33.
29 Id. Rule 2.2(a)(2).
30 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and W. William Hodes comment that the intermediation rules
"sound so many warnings and urge so much caution as to reveal a distinctly grudging attitude
towards mediation as such. The rules are so confining that prudent lawyers often will not
undertake this role, but will treat the representation as one involving a 'consented conflict'
under Rule 1.7(b) instead." 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of
Lawyering: A Handbook on The Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 2.2:103 (2d ed. 1990).
That lawyers prefer to act under Model Rule 1.7(b) is ironic, for although this Rule's
provisions for dealing with "consented conflicts" are much more laconic than Rule 2.2's, the
more elaborately stated safeguards of Rule 2.2 might all be seen as implicit in Rule 1.7(b) as
well.
31 See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 2.2 cmt. (identifying these duties). Presumably she
has these duties because here, as in "consented conflict" cases, she is understood to be
representing multiple individual clients, to each of whom she owes full loyalty and
confidentiality.
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keep her other clients adequately informed. 2 And because a failure
of the mediation will likely preclude her from representing any of the
clients33 and probably subject all of what any one of them has said to
her to discovery by the others, 4 she can hardly believe that there is
little risk of material prejudice unless she can say that the matter not
only can but probably will be resolved on terms compatible with the
clients' best interests.35
3. Organizational Representation
Given the vigilance on behalf of individual clients reflected in these
first two formulations of the lawyer's role, it is startling-even stun-
ning-to encounter the radically different regime envisaged by Model
Rule 1.13. The first subsection of this rule declares that "[a] lawyer
employed or retained by an organization represents the organization
acting through its duly authorized constituents. '3 6 This simple sen-
tence adopts the "entity theory" of organizational representation,
under which the lawyer for the organization does not represent its
shareholders, or officers, or employees, but instead represents an arti-
ficial entity, the organization.3 7 No doubt the most frequent applica-
tion of this proposition is in the field of corporate representation, but
32 Perhaps there is sometimes room for the lawyer to keep one client's secrets because the
other clients do not need to learn them-but exercising this discretion will surely require "a
delicate balance." Id.
33 Id. Rule 2.2(c). The Rule does not by its terms permit the lawyer to continue
representing any of the people for whom she served as an intermediary, even with the others'
consent-though perhaps the possibility of consent should be inferred.
34 This grim prospect is the result of "the prevailing rule... that as between commonly
represented clients the [attorney-client] privilege does not attach." Id. Rule 2.2 cmt. This
position holds even though the lawyer representing multiple clients has an ethical duty to
protect each client's confidentiality. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. The Comment
to the Model Rules' provision on confidentiality explains that
[t]he attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a
lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning
a client. The [ethics] rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than
those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law.
Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.6 cmt.
35 Hazard and Hodes observe that "[t]he clues that should lead a lawyer to refuse to
undertake a common representation are those suggesting a likelihood of failure." Hazard &
Hodes, supra note 30, § 2.2:203.
36 Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.13(a). See also Model Code, supra note 6, EC 5-18
("A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to the
entity and not to... [any individual] person connected with the entity.").
37 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 30, § 1.13:201.
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it may apply in a variety of other contexts, including our housing law-
yer's relationship to this group of tenants.
Its bearing on this situation stems from the fact that Rule 1.13
applies to unincorporated associations as well as to organizations hav-
ing corporate form. 38 Neither the Rule itself nor the accompanying
Comment defines "organization," but two influential commentators
have urged a very expansive treatment of the term in this context.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and W. William Hodes suggest that the rule
would also apply to seventeen homeowners who "form a group that
hires lawyer L to prosecute a nuisance action" and agree that they
will all abide by any settlement that twelve of their number approve.39
These facts, Hazard and Hodes indicate, give this set of people "an
identity apart from the individuals who comprise it,"'  and thus
transform them into an organization.
On this logic, the eight tenants, too, can readily be seen as such an
organization. It is true that these tenants have not, so far as the stated
facts reveal, agreed among themselves on any such decisionmaking
process. Perhaps they need not do so; perhaps they become an organ-
ization if they simply think of themselves as a group. But if they do
need to adopt some structure, then their lawyer can help them do so.
After all, lawyers help clients establish organizations all the time.
The lawyer could suggest that the tenants agree on a procedure for
resolving disagreements among themselves, and if, after proper coun-
seling about the potential consequences, they did reach an appropriate
38 Somewhat imprecisely, the Comment explicating Model Rule 1.13 states that "[t]he
duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations." Model Rules,
supra note 7, Rule 1.13 cmt. Presumably this observation is meant to refer to the duties
defined in the Rule itself, duties that are discussed in the Comment.
39 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 30, § 1.13:203. The authors note that "some courts would
treat the situation as one in which seventeen individuals have hired the same lawyer, each
retaining all the rights of a client," but they urge that the organizational characterization is
"[t]he better view." Id.
40 Id. § 1.13:103. The authors comment there that
[t]he more formal the association, the longer its duration, and the more elaborate its
purposes, the more likely it is that the group will be regarded as an entity that is distinct
from its individual constituents. But even a small group informally organized for a
limited purpose can be considered an entity. Indeed, a group can be formed primarily
for the very purpose of retaining counsel.
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agreement, the lawyer could represent them as an organization rather
than as eight separate clients.41
The consequences of this recharacterization are striking. Because
the lawyer now represents the entity, she no longer owes unqualified
loyalty or confidentiality to any of the eight tenants as individuals.4 2
Hence if one tenant provides her with information, she need not con-
vey this information to each of the others unless doing so is required
by her duty of loyalty to the organization.43 Conversely, if providing
the information to the group is necessary in order to keep it ade-
quately informed, the lawyer has no duty to protect the individual
tenant's secrets.' So, too, if the eight constituents of the organization
develop disagreements, her obligation is not to remain neutral as
between them. Rather, her obligation is to provide the best counsel
she can to the organization (though adopting a neutral stance might
still be appropriate, if neutrality best served the organization).
Even if the tenants' disagreements ripen into actual conflicts of
interest, their lawyer will not automatically have to withdraw, for she
does not represent the tenants as individuals. Her client is the group
itself, and the fact that some constituents of the group now dissent
from its collective decision does not automatically bar her from con-
tinuing to do the bidding of the group as an entity.45 So, for example,
if the tenants have agreed to abide by any settlement that two-thirds
of them approve, the lawyer can settle the case on behalf of the group
despite the wishes of the minority. The shift from the norms of indi-
41 The fact that there are only eight tenants, rather than the seventeen homeowners in
Hazard and Hodes' example, should not be a bar to "entity" status. Many organizations-
partnerships, in particular-can consist of only two people. ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 361 (1991) specifically confirms that partnerships are
"organizations" under Rule 1.13. The Opinion notes, however, that "[i]n small partnerships,
as with closely held corporations, it is more difficult to distinguish between representation of
the entity and of its individual owners." Id. at n.5.
42 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 30, § 1.13:106.
43 Id. § 1.13:107. If the information is relevant to the group's affairs, and if all members are
entitled under the group's rules to participate equally in the group's decisions, then in all
likelihood loyalty would require disclosure of this information to each of the tenants. Cf. ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 361 (1991) (stating that
"'information relating to the representation' of the partnership ... normally may not be
withheld [by the partnership's lawyer] from the individual partners").
44 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 30, § 1.13:107.
45 Hazard and Hodes emphasize that "[i]f need be,... [the lawyer] can even litigate on
behalf of the entity against its former constituents, because they do not qualify as former clients
for purposes of [Model] Rule L9." Id. § 1.13:106.
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vidual representation is particularly vivid here, for if the eight tenants
constituted eight individual clients, each of them might have an
unwaivable right to approve or reject any settlement.46 In short, the
modest steps by which a set of people can transform themselves into a
group sharply alter the role the lawyer can play, and in ways that
facilitate group action at the expense of individual prerogatives.
4. Class Representation
The fourth characterization of the lawyer's relationship to this set
of eight people is scarcely mentioned in either the Model Code or the
Model Rules.47 This characterization treats the eight individuals as
the named representatives of a class of all the tenants in the building
(a group of perhaps 150 people or more).48 The lawyer cannot turn
the tenants into class representatives without their consent,49 but once
this consent has been granted the lawyer acquires a freedom from the
wishes of the individual clients that in some ways exceeds even that
conferred by Model Rule 1.13.
Indeed, whereas Rule 1.13 facilitates a group's collective action, the
class action device is primarily concerned only with the group's col-
lective representation. The result of class action status may well be to
empower groups of people by facilitating their access to court, but the
people so empowered are not empowered as against their lawyer.
Certainly this is true as to the named class representatives, for accord-
46 See id. § 1.13:203. Rule 1.2(a) specifies that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter." Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.2(a).
This protection is not removed by Rule 1.2(c)'s authorization for lawyers to "limit the
objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation." Id. Rule 1.2(c).
Instead, the Comment declares that "the client may not be asked... to surrender ... the right
to settle litigation that the lawyer might wish to continue." Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule
1.2 cmt.; accord Model Code, supra note 6, EC 7-7.
47 For modest exceptions to this generalization, see Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.2
cmt.; Model Code, supra note 6, DR 2-104(A)(5). Charles Wolfram observes that "[d]espite
the prominence of. . . [conflict] issues in class actions, nothing in the professional codes
addresses them directly. Instead, the matter has been left, correctly, to regulation through the
close judicial supervision that ideally attends class actions." Wolfram, supra note 25, § 8.14,
at 493. Whether this silence of the codes is altogether "correct" is debatable.
48 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
49 Lawrence M. Grosberg, Class Actions and Client-Centered Decisionmaking, 40 Syracuse
L. Rev. 709, 754 & n.204 (1989). Potential class representatives must consent to their status
because of the various effects that having their issue handled as a class action may have on
them-not least, that they lose the power to determine when and on what terms the matter
will be settled. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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ing to the standard interpretation of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the lawyer owes her most fundamental duty of loy-
alty not to them but to the class itselff. With judicial approval,51 she
may settle the case despite the objections of a majority of the named
representatives. 2 Moreover, the existence of disagreements within
the class by no means automatically precludes class certification,53
although if these disagreements are profound enough they may lead to
the designation of subclasses with separate representation. 4 Finally,
even-or especially-the class as a whole lacks the power to direct the
lawyer's actions, because the class typically has no decisionmaking
structure through which it can act. As a result, the lawyer's responsi-
bility for gauging what is in the class's best interests is profound, and
a court may approve a settlement endorsed by the class lawyer even if
most class members-and, it would seem, most named class repre-
sentatives--object.
55
50 Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The compelling obligation of
class counsel in class action litigation is to the group which makes up the class."); Rhode,
supra note 19, at 1203 ("counsel's fiduciary obligations run to the class as a whole").
51 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Rule 23(e) does not by its terms require judicial approval for a
lawyer's refusal to settle a case, but authority to scrutinize such decisions might be implied
there or perhaps more readily in Rule 23(d), which empowers trial courts to make
"appropriate orders" in "the conduct of actions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d). Among these can be
orders "requiring, for the protection of the members of the class .... that notice be given...
to some or all of the members of any step in the action." Id. The Manual for Complex
Litigation, Second states that if "[c]lass representatives... favor acceptance of a settlement
offer that class counsel believe is inadequate.., class counsel should ordinarily ask the court to
determine whether prelininary approval should be given and a fairness hearing scheduled."
Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, § 30.43, at 240 (1986) [hereinafter Manual]. The
Manual also observes, however, that "the court should rarely approve a settlement that
counsel do not recommend." Id.
52 County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1325 (2d Cir. 1990)
(affirming a class action settlement despite claims that it was opposed by a majority of the class
representatives). The Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, however, instructs that "[t]he
views of the class representatives are... often entitled to special weight because they have a
better understanding of the case than most members of the class. Moreover, their objections to
a settlement may be symptomatic of strained attorney-client relations that may have affected
settlement negotiations." Manual, supra note 51, § 30.43, at 240.
53 See 7A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1768, at 330-31 (2d ed. 1986); Rhode, supra note 19, at 1194-95 (describing
conflicting case law on whether "substantial internal opposition" will, or will not, "preclude
class status").
54 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B). For a discussion and critique of subclassing and similar
responses to disunity in class actions, see Rhode, supra note 19, at 1221-32.
55 See TBK Partners v. Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 462 (2d Cir. 1982) (opposition
of majority of the class "cannot serve as an automatic bar to a settlement").
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B. The Lawyer's Role in Selecting a Framework
It may be surprising to learn how far existing ethical and legal prin-
ciples permit lawyers to depart from the stringent safeguards of indi-
vidual client autonomy that play so important a part in the
profession's norms. But because this discretion does exist, lawyers
must decide how to use it. It might be objected that this potential
departure from the protection of individual autonomy is
unproblematic, because it is the clients themselves who decide
whether to be characterized as individuals, an organization, or repre-
sentatives of a class. In that sense, organizational or class representa-
tion can be seen as resting on a valid waiver of some amount of
individual autonomy. But as a practical and a legal matter, this
choice of characterization does not rest exclusively with the clients.
One source of the lawyer's influence on this decision is that it is
plainly her responsibility to counsel these individuals on their
choice. 56 Perhaps the eight tenants who arrived in the lawyer's office
did not conceive of themselves as an "organization" or as the repre-
sentatives of a class; it is up to the lawyer to explain the significance of
these characterizations and to counsel these individuals on what char-
acterization they and the lawyer should adopt.57 In addition, the law-
yer may well have the authority to condition her representation of the
clients on their agreement to one status or another. 8 Although cli-
56 Both the Model Rules and the Model Code call on lawyers to counsel their clients. See
Model Rules, supra note 7, Rules 1.4, 2.1; Model Code, supra note 6, EC 7-8. Counseling at
least entails a clear identification of the likely consequences of each option available to the
client, and most lawyers probably agree that good counseling also often requires the lawyer to
state her opinion of what the client should do in light of these consequences. Cf. infra notes
79-80 and accompanying text (discussing the role of advice-giving in a model of client-centered
lawyering).
57 Perhaps, on the other hand, the tenants have already decided to constitute themselves as
a group, but the lawyer foresees sharp conflicts among the group members and fears that the
result will be that individuals within the group will be severely harmed. Here, her obligation
would be to counsel the eight as a group-for that is how the tenants currently see
themselves-about the possible wisdom of disbanding, or of being represented as individuals.
She might also seek private meetings with the individual members to pursue these matters;
going outside the group meeting could be an impingement on the tenants' decision to present
themselves as a group, but might be justified here on paternalistic grounds. For further
discussion of the considerations affecting the lawyer's use of private meetings with individual
group members, see infra notes 68-73, 96-101 and accompanying text.
58 See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.2(c). The Comment to this provision states that
"[t]he terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific objectives or
means. Such limitations may exclude objectives or means that the lawyer regards as repugnant
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ents may object to these conditions, clients who have few options for
obtaining counsel are not in a good position to insist on their objec-
tions, because the lawyer is likely to have the authority to decline to
represent them if she considers the form of representation they seek to
be repugnant or imprudent.5 9 Having rejected these clients, she may
then solicit others, through advertising,1° personal letters, 61 or even-
if the lawyer is a public interest lawyer-through in-person contacts.62
Indeed, the lawyer's discretion to enter into individual or group
representation would have come into play even if only a single tenant
had originally consulted her. Had she learned that her first client was
one of many facing similar problems, she might have concluded that
collective efforts were needed.63  At that point, she might have
assisted this tenant to begin organizing a tenants' group. Alterna-
tively, she might have developed a court case naming this individual
as a representative of a class, or she might even have declined to rep-
or imprudent." Id. at cmt. The Model Code contains no such broad and express
authorization of limitations on goals or means. See, e.g., Model Code, supra note 6, DR 7-
101(B)(1) (authorizing the lawyer to waive a right of her client "[w]here permissible").
Charles Wolfram, while tracing the ambiguities in the Model Code, suggests that it "essentially
takes the position [about the allocation of power between lawyer and client] that the 1983
Model Rules restate." Wolfram, supra note 25, § 4.3, at 157.
59 Under the Model Rules, lawyers can withdraw from cases on the basis of such judgments,
and presumably can decline to undertake the cases in the first place as well. See Model Rules,
supra note 7, Rule 1.16(b)(3). See also id. Rule 1.2(c) (authorizing agreements to limit the
objectives of representation). The provisions of the Model Code appear to confine lawyers'
right to withdraw more tightly, see Model Code, supra note 6, DR 2-1 10(C)(I)(e), and perhaps
the right to refuse cases is also slightly more constrained under the Code than under the Model
Rules. The Code's EC 2-26 might be read to confirm the existence of such a constraint in its
call for lawyers to accept their share of "unattractive" litigation. Id. EC 2-26. But this call is
not dramatically different from language to be found in the Model Rules, see Model Rules,
supra note 7, Rule 6.2 cmt., and EC 2-26 goes on to declare that "[a] lawyer is under no
obligation to act as advisor or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client
... ." Model Code, supra note 6, EC 2-26.
60 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1976).
61 Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
62 Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (finding solicitation on behalf of ACLU
protected by the First Amendment as exercise of "associational freedom") with Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (holding that the Ohio Bar Association could
constitutionally discipline an attorney for soliciting clients for pecuniary gain).
63 The potential value of collective response is one of the recurrent concerns in the
"rebellious idea of lawyering against subordination" being articulated by Gerald L6pez. See
Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious
Collaboration, 77 Geo. L.J. 1603, 1608, 1706, 1714-15 (1989). See also sources cited supra
note 2 (endorsing the mobilization of disadvantaged groups).
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resent this tenant, if the tenant was uninterested in collective action,
and launched her own effort to find a group to represent.
Because lawyers can wield so profound an influence on the charac-
terization of their clients, they must be sensitive to the values at stake
in its exercise. The rules of ethics suggest that the bond between an
individual client and his lawyer, a bond in which the client's secrets
are jealously guarded and his interests zealously advocated, is an
essential protection of individual autonomy. Principles of client-cen-
tered practice suggest that even within this attorney-client dyad, the
client's autonomy is still in danger from lawyers who wittingly or
unwittingly override the client's own wishes in favor of outcomes that
the lawyers prefer. Group representation cannot protect individual
autonomy in the same ways, or perhaps to the same extent, as individ-
ual representation does. As Part II of this Article will show, however,
group representation is by no means always opposed to individual
autonomy; instead, group representation is essential to protect those
aspects of autonomy that people express through their membership in
groups-as well as those values beyond autonomy's purview that
republicans, feminists and others suggest collective engagement may
serve. This is not to deny, though, that individual and group interests
may diverge, even in the context of a group that does in a broad sense
give expression both to autonomy and connection. Parts III and IV
will respond to this reality by outlining the elements of a "group cli-
ent-centeredness" by which lawyers can give substantial protection to
these cross-cutting concerns.
II. INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND GROUP REPRESENTATION
It might be tempting to respond to the threat to autonomy seem-
ingly posed in group representation by saying that such representation
should no longer be permitted. If there were a fundamental contra-
diction between group representation and individual autonomy, this
response would be a powerful one. But this argument cannot succeed,
despite the force of its fimdamental premise that individual autonomy
must be protected, because it ignores the value that group action and
association may have for individuals, and the degree to which effective
groups may draw strength precisely from their respect for individual
members' autonomy.
The assertion that people can protect their individual wishes
through group membership is hardly a revelation; a central lesson of
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modem life is that it is very difficult for people to protect themselves
against others' encroachment except through group involvement that
overcomes the barriers to effective individual action. This lesson has
not been lost on those who join together as corporate shareholders, or
as union members, and William Simon is certainly right to say that
other people, too, can benefit from group action and representation."M
But group membership can honor individual autonomy in a more
direct, less instrumental, sense as well.
People's membership in groups is often itself an expression of their
individual autonomy. People choose to become husbands or wives,
they choose to join tenants' associations, and they choose to give their
time to the ACLU or the NAACP or any of a countless range of other
groups. To some degree every such commitment limits the chooser's
future choices, but our acceptance of these limits is precisely an
expression of our autonomous capacity to shape our lives. Most such
choices also reflect a willingness to accept some future collective judg-
ments with which the individual member disagrees; generally, it is no
part of these decisions to insist that everything must go our way or the
deal is off. Even our membership in groups that we did not originally
choose to join, such as (we may assume) the families, religions, and
races into which we are born, may express our autonomy, for our
continued acknowledgement and celebration of these originally invol-
untary ties will over time come to contain at least an element of
choice.6" Indeed, this blending of the voluntary and the involuntary is
a recurrent feature of our lives. For example, the eight tenants of our
example have become victims of their landlord without having aspired
to that status. Their need to defend themselves against the landlord is
unchosen, perhaps bitterly regretted; their decisions about how, if at
all, to meet that need nonetheless will involve countless choices, exer-
cises of autonomy, in shaping their own lives. When we make con-
nections, or adhere to them, we express our autonomy.
At the same time, groups can draw strength from their endorse-
ment or accommodation of their members' autonomy. It will not do
to exaggerate the extent to which groups undermine themselves when
they deny their members' right to participate in or secede from the
group's decisionmaking-cultish religions and disciplined armies
64 See Simon, supra note 12, at 481-82 & n.35.
65 See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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attest to the power of nondemocratic groups to inspire and mobilize
their members. But groups that encourage their members to speak
their minds, and to listen to other members as they do the same,
reduce the risks of fanaticism, corruption, and disruptive secession-
all risks that are far from fanciful-and can foster in their stead
mutual recognition, understanding, and growth. 66 When people sin-
cerely join groups committed to such internal practices, they make,
and benefit from, a pledge to protect each other's autonomy.
In short, for the law generally to undercut or deny our group con-
nections would, even judged solely from the perspective of autonomy,
be bizarre. It would deny us the efficacy that group action can pro-
vide. It would also deny us the autonomy expressed in our choices to
join or adhere to groups. By devaluing commitments that help define
who we are, moreover, it would amount to a form of disrespect for
our capacity to shape our own lives. If it is possible to honor these
aspects of autonomy without sacrificing other, even more pressing,
autonomy claims-as I will argue in Part IV-then this disrespect
cannot be justified in the name of autonomy. On the contrary, I sug-
gest it amounts to a moral wrong.
67
It might be argued, however, that lawyers' insistence on represent-
ing each member of a group as an individual in no way denies the
66 See Michelman, supra note 1, at 1526-28 (offering a republican response to the reality of
social dissensus, an image of "a self whose identity and freedom consist, in part, in... test[ing]
its current understandings ... communicatively, by reaching for the perspectives of other and
different persons"); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1548-51, 1554-55 (describing republican
aspiration to the achievement of "general agreement through deliberation" aided by empathy).
See also Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 10, 70-95 (1987) (arguing that justice requires us to "acknowledge and struggle
against [our] partiality by making an effort to understand [others'] reality," while recognizing
the tragic necessity of sometimes choosing between conflicting values).
67 Charles Fried describes "disrespect between persons" as "a form of immorality" in his
well-known and controversial article, Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060, 1088 (1976). I take it that he
holds this view because he sees disrespect of another person as a denial of that person's status
as "a responsible, valuable, and valuing agent." Id. at 1069. Fried's conception of human
agents places an intense value on autonomy, a value so great that he suggests that "[p]erhaps
we recognize family ties because, after all, there often has been an element of choice, but also
because-by some kind of atavism or superstition-we identify with those who share a part of
our biological natures." Id. at 1071. This view seems to miss the real importance of
apparently unchosen affiliations in our moral lives, see Shaffer, supra note 5, but if autonomous
choice deserves any recognition as a fundamental part of our lives then unnecessarily denying
us the prerogative of choice does seem morally wrong.
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group members' affiliation to their group. But this is not always true.
Consider an example:68
A husband and wife come to a lawyer to have their wills prepared.
The husband explains the terms that they want in their wills; the law-
yer asks the wife if she agrees with what her husband has said, and
she nods and says "yes," but nothing else. The lawyer prepares the
documents accordingly. But when the couple return for their next
meeting, at which the wills are to be signed, the lawyer explains that
he first wants to talk with the wife alone. Outside the husband's pres-
ence, the lawyer asks the wife if the will as drafted is actually in
accordance with her wishes.
I suggest that the lawyer's decision to speak with the wife outside
the husband's presence may well constitute a refusal to accept the
integrity of the couple's mutual affiliation. This choice perhaps
reflects the lawyer's feeling that the husband might be overriding the
wife's preferences, that the lawyer can only get at the truth by freeing
the wife temporarily from her husband's domination, and that it is the
lawyer's place to judge the quality of this couple's joint decisionmak-
ing.69 But people who choose to marry have committed themselves to
a vast range of joint decisionmaking, the fairness of which will be
essentially unreviewable by any third party. Such commitments can
fade, but perhaps this one has not. If these spouses remain committed
to making choices together, that does not mean that when they arrive
in the lawyer's office, they impliedly represent that they are in perfect
agreement or that their joint decisions are made in perfect ways. On
this reading of the story, however, they may impliedly represent that
they are committed to joint decisionmaking, one product of which
they now wish the lawyer to implement. In the face of that commit-
ment, the lawyer's insistence on separating the spouses is a form of
disrespect for this couple as a couple-and they may feel it as such.
But this story can be read very differently. Perhaps this couple's
affiliation was already disturbed, as the wife's virtual silence might
63 This example is drawn, and modified, from a problem originally posed in the Legal Ethics
Forum section of the American Bar Association Journal. The Case of the Unwanted Will, 65
A.B.A. J. 484 (1979). For a thoughtful discussion of this "case," see Shaffer, supra note 5, at
968-72.
69 The lawyer may hold these attitudes, or he may not. The lawyer might insist on a
separate interview with the quieter party simply as a prophylactic and routine safeguard rather
than because of any such assessment of this marriage, and the husband and wife might
understand the lawyer's action in just this way as well.
1992] 1125
1126 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 78:1103
have loudly declared.7° Certainly there is reason to be anxious about
men's power within marriages (and in other relationships with
women), and to be sensitive to the potentially grim meanings of this
woman's silence-although it remains possible that she made an
entirely uncoerced choice to be relatively quiet.7 ' Such considerations
surely did give this lawyer reason for concern, and I do not suggest
that his obligations to this couple as a group called on him to dismiss
these concerns from his mind.
Even so, his decision to separate the two spouses remains problem-
atic. Unless some legal or moral mandate justified removing this deci-
sion from the purview of the couple,72 the lawyer had other options
available that could have tested the validity of the alternative readings
of the wife's near-silence without so disrupting the couple's associa-
tion. These options are techniques of working with these two spouses
together-techniques that are meant to vindicate, where possible,
both the group's collective association and its members' individual
autonomy. Delineating such techniques, and exploring both their
70 In the original version of this story, the wife says nothing at all in the joint session, and
when questioned alone she reveals that she would not sign the will as drafted if her husband
"were not to know the ultimate disposition of her estate." The Case of the Unwanted Will,
supra note 68, at 484.
71 Perhaps she handled the family's taxes, whereas her husband was responsible for estate
planning. Perhaps she found making a will unnerving, although her husband was undisturbed
by it. Perhaps she and her husband had talked at length about the general shape the wills
should take, and spelling out the details to the lawyer struck her as routine or even boring.
72 Perhaps wills should be considered specially individual matters, so individual that each
testator must be given a special opportunity to shed the bonds of whatever groups he or she is a
part of. So, too, competent adults might have a special right to make their own health care
decisions, a right whose protection requires that a physician spend some time alone with a
patient facing a major medical choice.
Similarly, criminal defendants might well be seen as having an unwaivable right to decide
how to handle their cases, no matter how intense the contrary wishes of any group of which
they were a part. (If so, criminal lawyers might still be able to condition their representation of
potential clients on the clients' "committing [themselves] to the decisions of the group," in the
words of a retainer form quoted in Creative Defenses in Civil Disobedience Cases, 42 Nat'l
Law. Guild Prac. 97, 117-18 (1985), but clients on this view would at least have to be told that
they could always change their minds about this commitment.) Lawyers might also have a
corollary duty to interview the individual members of a set of criminal defendants separately to
ascertain their willingness to act in a fashion that allowed the lawyer to provide multiple
representation without conflict of interest-even if the members made clear that they regarded
such separate interviews as an affront to their mutual affiliations. Because at least some special
solicitude for individual autonomy seems appropriate in criminal representation, this Article's
recommendations for lawyering on behalf of groups are focused on civil rather than criminal
representation.
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value and their limitations, will be the focus of Part IV of this Article;
here, my purpose is only to illustrate that such methods of accommo-
dating group and individual claims are possible. Indeed, they are
readily apparent; after all, another explanation of the wife's failure to
speak at length is that the lawyer has not asked her questions that
called on her to do so. Such questions could well be asked, but in the
presence of the husband; indeed, the lawyer could tell both spouses
together that it was important for each of them to explain to him their
reasons for wanting these wills. The lawyer could even have told
them that sometimes people do not see issues that they should con-
sider until they talk things through with a third party, and thus urged
them to speak not for his benefit but for each other's.73
All of these steps respond to the possibility that the wife needs the
lawyer's help to express herself in the face of her husband's domina-
tion, yet they do so without parting the spouses and in fact they call
on the spouses themselves to resolve their own possible problem.
Once these steps have been taken, others of course may turn out to be
appropriate, in light of the ways that husband and wife respond to
these efforts by the lawyer. The lawyer may decide that separating
the spouses is what is called for; he might even see the need for more
fundamental interventions, such as advising separate representation
or recommending a family therapist. Or he might conclude that this
man and woman have freely and collaboratively thought through the
issues involved in making wills, and ask them to execute the docu-
ments then and there.
As this example suggests, automatic disaffiliation is not a satisfying
response to the tension between individual autonomy and group mem-
bership. Though this example also suggests some better responses, it
remains to be seen whether individual autonomy can in general be
meaningfully protected within the context of group representation.
That is not a question of theory so much as of technique; to answer it,
we must identify actual methods of lawyering through which attor-
neys can honor both autonomy and connection.
73 All of the techniques mentioned in the text are verbal. Nonverbal techniques can also be
useful, as demonstrated in Robert M. Bastress & Joseph D. Harbaugh, Interviewing,
Counseling and Negotiating: Skills for Effective Representation 137-40, 157 (1990) (analyzing
body language in a lawyer's interview of a married couple with a potential tort claim).
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III. THE STANDARD OF GROUP CLIENT-CENTEREDNESS
Before we begin to examine techniques of group counseling, we
need a standard for comparison-that is, we need a model of lawyers'
practice with individual clients in which we are satisfied that individ-
ual autonomy is being protected, so that we can compare what law-
yers can do in group representation with what they do in this form of
individual practice. In fact, however, designing a method of inter-
viewing and counseling individual clients that will infallibly ascertain
their true wishes is beyond our grasp, and probably always will be.
The interactions between lawyer and client in some measure shape
both parties, and when the less powerful member of this dyad is the
client it seems likely that the client will be more shaped than shaping.
Nonetheless it is helpful to begin with the model of "client-centered
lawyering" as a benchmark from individual practice, for despite its
imperfections this model does aspire to, and should in good part real-
ize, the goal of protecting the autonomy of individual clients.74 Cli-
ent-centered practice rests on the premise that individuals should
make their legal decisions for themselves. But they should not make
these decisions on impulse or in ignorance. Instead, it is the lawyer's
job to win the client's trust and cooperation, so that the lawyer can
understand the client's situation and engage the client in a very care-
ful process of decisionmaking. Winning the client's trust is by no
means automatic, and the lawyer may have to nurture the client's
cooperation in a variety of ways. Perhaps most important, the lawyer
must offer the client her empathetic understanding-she must convey
to the client that she hears, understands, accepts and does not judge
him.75 In this way, the lawyer forges a "community of two" in which
74 A number of scholars have formulated guidelines for legal practice reflecting a "client-
centered" conviction that lawyers should interact attentively and helpfully, rather than
domineeringly, with clients. See Bastress & Harbaugh, supra note 73; Thomas L. Shaffer &
James R. Elkins, Legal Interviewing and Counseling in a Nutshell (2d ed. 1987). I rely here,
however, on the model of client-centeredness provided in David A. Binder, Paul Bergman &
Susan C. Price, Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach (1991) [hereinafter
Lawyers as Counselors]. In an earlier article, I discussed ways that client-centered practice (as
explicated in David A. Binder & Susan C. Price, Legal Interviewing and Counseling: A Client-
Centered Approach (1977) [hereinafter Legal Interviewing and Counseling]) falls short of
complete fidelity to individual clients' autonomy. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients,
34 UCLA L. Rev. 717, 733-53 (1987).
75 See Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 74, at 40-44, 46-68.
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effective counseling can occur.76 Then, with the lawyer's guidance,
the client will go through a series of decisionmaking steps, first articu-
lating his objectives, then identifying the alternatives open to him,
next reviewing the pluses and minuses of each one. The lawyer par-
ticipates in each of these stages with the client, helping the client to
identify his various concerns and to collect them together for his ulti-
mate choice,77 and perhaps bolstering his belief that he can indeed
handle his situation and the task of making decisions about it.78 In
the process, the lawyer will certainly offer the client advice about the
likely consequences of the various alternatives.79 If the client so
requests, the lawyer may also offer explicit advice about what option
the client should choose; this advice should normally be based on her
understanding of the values the client adheres to, as the lawyer has
ascertained them in the course of the counseling process. In addition,
the lawyer has the prerogative of offering unsolicited advice, whether
to correct misjudgments she believes the client is making or to express
her own moral concerns about the client's plans.80
The lesson of client-centered practice seems to be that the protec-
tion of individual autonomy requires an intimate and detailed engage-
ment between the lawyer and the client. This is a disturbing lesson to
take to an assessment of group practice, because it is inconceivable
that such an engagement could take place between the lawyer and
76 William Simon applied the term "community-of-two" to what he called the
"Psychological Vision" of lawyer-client relations in William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus:
Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 487, 492 (1980) (quoting Philip Rieff, The
Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud 52 (1966)).
77 See Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 74, at 287-308. The authors are careful to point
out that the actual process of counseling is not rigidly sequenced, but rather is "typically
cyclical." Id. at 310.
78 Binder, Bergman, and Price by no means suggest that lawyers offer lavish praise of their
clients' decisionmaking abilities-perhaps because such praise would be both condescending
and ineffective. The sheer process of carrying out the steps of the counseling process in
accordance with the lawyer's guidance, however, should often help clients to feel in command
of their situation. At least indirectly, moreover, what the client-centered lawyer says should
encourage this feeling. Thus Binder, Bergman, and Price offer an example of a preparatory
explanation preceding the counseling process, an explanation in which the lawyer sketches the
steps of the process and then observes, "This will give you a solid basis for whatever decision
you ultimately make." Id. at 289.
79 Id. at 260, 293-95.
80 Id. at 279-86, 347-61. Binder, Bergman, and Price sanction considerably more advice-
giving by lawyers than did Binder and Price in the predecessor volume. See id. at xxii. For a
critique of the position taken on this issue in Legal Interviewing and Counseling, supra note
74, see Ellmann, supra note 74, at 744-48.
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each member of a group in a meeting between the lawyer and the
group. Group members are generally unlikely to reveal themselves to
their fellow members with the candor that they might be brought to
show with the lawyer alone. Even if the members of a group were
each prepared for such public revelations, none of them-nor the law-
yer-would have time for the process. And even if everyone had
courage and time enough for such a venture, at the end of it there
would still have to be a decision by the group. Successfully making
that collective judgment, a process often fraught with the potential for
disagreement and disunity, will require forms of interaction that the
encounter of a single lawyer and client does not encompass.
It is no solution to these problems to suggest that the lawyer should
do client-centered counseling with each member of the group, sepa-
rately, and then represent the group based on the sum of the individu-
als' individually-stated preferences. Such a program would be
doomed to failure, for three distinct reasons. First, as soon as the
group attained even modest size an effort to interview and counsel
each of its members would be impossibly expensive in terms of the
lawyer's time and (for whoever was paying for that time) in terms of
money as well. Second, even if the lawyer could hold such sessions
with each member, her effort to calculate the "sum" of the individu-
als' preferences would at best be imprecise, for no mathematical
calculus allows the easy combination of a host of preferences, with all
the differences of perception and intensity that may underlie them."1
Third, even if both of the preceding problems could be remedied,
the lawyer would have to recognize that the sum of the members'
preferences as voiced to her is not the equivalent of the group's deci-
sion. Group members influence each other, whether the group is a
married couple or a larger assembly. People who choose to become
members of groups have chosen to enter a setting in which they will
influence and be influenced, and in which decisions they make as a
group will be the product of this interaction. To take the sum of the
members' preferences without the tempering effects of this interaction
is to eliminate the very process that the members themselves have
evidently accepted as the path for refining their individual assessments
81 See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121, 2134
(1990) ("[N]o noncontroversial, objective way to gauge such [preference] intensities has been
found.").
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and combining them into a collective judgment. It is also to substi-
tute for the group members' mutual impact the lawyer's substantial
influence, whether intentional or unintentional, exerted on each group
member in the privacy of a one-on-one encounter. The only way the
lawyer can obtain a collective decision is to engage, in some way, with
the group's collective processes.82
Let us consider, therefore, the contours of client-centered counsel-
ing when the client is a group.83 In doing so, we will primarily be
82 Where the number of clients is very large, as in some class actions, it is likely to be
impossible for the lawyer to meet with, or elicit any collective decision from, the group as a
whole. See supra note 19. (Such groups, for that very reason, are not the focus of this Article,
see supra pp. 1110-11.) With groups of this size, the lawyer may resort to meeting separately
with a few individual members, who will serve as (hopefully) representative examples from
whom the lawyer can discern the sentiments of the many absent members. Larry Grosberg
advocates this sort of sampling of class member sentiments in Grosberg, supra n6te 49, at 768-
69, 778. Opinion polling may also be useful as another source of a "snapshot" of client
thinking. See id. at 778; Rhode, supra note 19, at 1256.
If these individual clients express differing views, however, then the lawyer must decide how
to harmonize their diverse sentiments. Here, as in the representation of smaller groups, it may
be helpful for the lawyer to ask the several class members to meet together, and hammer out
their own compromise position. This process would make sense if the class members would
indeed see themselves as "in the same boat," and would acknowledge a responsibility to each
other that could best be elucidated in shared discussion rather than in separate contacts with
the lawyer alone; I think it is reasonable to assume that class members would hold these views,
although this assumption should certainly be open to rebuttal. Even if this assumption is
correct, in any event, where the participants in this meeting are only a small fraction of the
actual class, the lawyer cannot hope for certainty that their preferred solution is the preferred
solution of the class, and she is likely to have to make judgments of her own about what to seek
on behalf of her clients. For an insightful exploration of ways the lawyer might make these
judgments, see Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness (paper
presented at Columbia Clinical Theory Workshop, Nov. 22, 1991) (on file with The Virginia
Law Review Association).
Although this Article is concerned with describing how lawyers should interact with group
clients when such interaction actually is feasible, the problem of absent members is not wholly
eliminated by this focus. Surely it is quite common that many members of groups who
theoretically could assemble for a meeting with their lawyer will in fact fail to do so. (For a
discussion of the difficulties of eliciting high participation in group meetings with lawyers, see
Rhode, supra note 19, at 1234.) The importance of the lawyer's learning the opinions of absent
members, or gauging how they would react to the views of the members who do attend, will
depend on the degree to which the people who come to the meetings are representative of the
others, either because they are typical of their fellows or because they have been empowered by
the others to represent them.
83 The analysis that follows assumes that the lawyer is actually able to deal directly with the
group. This assumption will not always hold true, for some groups will have leaders or agents
(house counsel, for example) who speak to the lawyer, and who-perhaps accurately, perhaps
not-represent that they speak for the group. Groups of disadvantaged people have the same
prerogative to deal with their lawyer through designated agents as do the members of a
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explicating the kind of lawyer-client relations that should be permit-
ted in the group representation sanctioned by Model Rule 1.13,
although some of what I propose should be useful even when the law-
yer's relationship to the people she represents is characterized as the
representation of multiple individuals or of a class-indeed, whenever
the lawyer represents, and meets jointly with, more than one person in
the same matter.84 Broadly, we may say that just as standard client-
centeredness seeks to encourage individual clients to make decisions
through a careful, deliberate and rational process, so group client-
centeredness would seek the same achievement from the group.
Broadly, too, the elements of a well-considered decision are the same
for a group as for an individual. Multiple decisionmakers, like indi-
viduals, should clarify their goals, identify the available courses of
action, weigh their pluses and minuses, and then decide what to do.
As we will see, however, the details of group decisionmaking are quite
different from the process of individual choice. Specifying the ele-
ments of group client-centeredness is partly a question of identifying
techniques that are responsive to these realities of group functioning.
The choice of techniques, however, is not just a question of efficiency
but also of morality. The techniques to be adopted should be those
that will advance the autonomy and functioning of the group, so as to
reap the benefits of group association and action, but these techniques
corporate board of directors. Hazard and Hodes observe, indeed, that "[t]he lawyer can best
serve the [entity] client by keeping lines of communication open to those whose job it is to act
for the entity, and being guided by their judgments, which she should normally assume are in
the best interests of the entity." Hazard & Hodes, supra note 30, § 1.13:109, at 400.
Nonetheless, the lawyer for an organizational client must also be aware of the possibility of
the agents' unfaithfulness to the entity for which they act, and may have to take action when
she encounters it. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.13(b), (c). The gravity of this risk
may be greater, moreover, in some groups than in others, and the need for vigilance by the
lawyer correspondingly greater as well. See infra note 86. In many relatively loosely
organized groups, in addition, it may not be entirely clear to the lawyer whose job it actually is
"to act for the entity," and Hazard and Hodes consider it the lawyer's first responsibility to
ascertain this. Hazard & Hodes, supra note 30, § 1.13:109, at 400. It may therefore be
necessary for the lawyer to initiate contact with the group's other members for this reason.
Perhaps more important, many members of the groups that public interest lawyers represent
may be quite inexperienced in handling the organizational and substantive issues that their
organizations confront. They seem likely to welcome the lawyer's direct interaction, and likely
to profit from it as well.
84 Thus, for example, the lawyer representing a group whose membership has delegated
responsibility for decisions bearing on the lawyer's work to a board may never meet with the
group as a whole, but she might well make use of these techniques if she met with the board.
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should also protect the autonomy of the individual members, whose
decisions to enter or remain in groups are an essential part of what
makes groups worth protecting and representing."5 The guidelines in
the following Sections seek to respond to the issues of both technique
and morality.
Before we begin, however, it is important to bring to the surface an
important premise embedded to some extent in both the empirical
description I have just given of how groups make decisions and in the
normative prescription I have just made for the fashioning of tech-
niques that protect both autonomy and connection. This premise is
that groups do in fact decide through a process of shared decision-
making by the members. This premise may seem self-evident, but in
fact it is not even always true. Sometimes people voluntarily join, and
feel deeply loyal to, groups in which they know that their views will
not be taken into account on many or most questions; those who join
armies, or some churches, are examples. I do not question people's
right to join such groups, or (in general) the right of their leaders to
exercise the power over group members that such groups generate.
In developing the contours of group dlient-centeredness, however, I
will be describing ways of lawyering that are most appropriate for
groups that accept democratic values, and accept in particular that
the members themselves are the ultimate decisionmaking authority
and that significant decisions should normally reflect the members'
input. Groups founded on these principles may be the most promis-
ing structure, at least in many parts of our lives, for honoring both
individual autonomy and mutual connection. In addition, groups
accepting these premises are a characteristic form of private associa-
tion in this country. I suspect, moreover, that most groups of disad-
vantaged people represented by public interest lawyers actually would
affirm these values. Techniques suited for the representation of such
groups, accordingly, should be valuable in a broad array of cases.
How fully any given group adheres to these values is, to be sure, an
empirical question. It is a question to which some groups will have
generated clear answers long before the lawyer's arrival on the scene.
Where such answers exist, the lawyer should normally abide by them
(and if need be, modify her techniques accordingly), on the ground
85 This standard reflects the argument made earlier that both the claims of connection and
of autonomy deserve to be honored. See supra notes 13-20 and 64-67 and accompanying text.
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that they represent this set of people's collective judgment about the
balance they will keep between the claims of autonomy and group
connection. The lawyer's deference to such group rules should not be
absolute, however, for she cannot ignore-though she should not
exaggerate-the possibility that even affiliations that people have in
some sense, or at some time, chosen are now profoundly oppressive.86
Particularly in the groups that public interest lawyers are likely to
represent, however, it seems likely that often this question will not
have been clearly or conclusively answered in advance. Where the
answer is not fixed, moreover, the lawyer herself may affect it, by
sponsoring one form of group process or another.87 In such circum-
stances, the moral desirability of democratic processes, and the wide
popular acceptance of democratic norms in this country, counsel in
favor of a presumption that the group is committed to such principles.
Let us now turn, therefore, to the elements of representing democratic
groups.
86 For an instance of such possible oppression, see the discussion of the married couple
making a will, supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. Plainly groups differ in the degree to
which they constitute a threat to their members' autonomy. Family membership, for example,
is hardly a voluntary choice for young children, yet we would not normally imagine that a
family in which parents could "outvote" their small children was an oppressive institution.
Similarly, corporations may offer little effective voice to those who dissent from management's
practices, yet our concern for minority shareholders is somewhat diminished by our awareness
of how easily they often can "exit" the corporation by selling their shares. For an insightful
contrast between the characteristics of "membership" in corporations and unions-the latter
arguably presenting much more reason for concern about internal democracy-see James G.
Pope, Two Faces, Two Ethics: Labor Union Lawyers and the Emerging Doctrine of Entity
Ethics, 68 Or. L. Rev. 1, 20-22, 27-28 (1989). So, too, considerable attention to the protection
of the individual members of such groups as tenant associations may be appropriate, in part
because the members may lack the knowledge, self-confidence, and resources needed to mount
independent challenges against their leaders.
87 The lawyer should, I suggest, be particularly protective of the autonomy of individual
members when the lawyer herself brought their group into existence. Her influence on the
members' constituting themselves as a group may have been altogether benign, and their
acceptance of her advice altogether free. But the danger that a skilled and sympathetic
professional may even inadvertently push people into associations they would not otherwise
have accepted puts the lawyer who gave such advice under a duty to monitor its results. This
responsibility would not be one of indefinite duration, because surely at some point the lawyer
could fairly say that the group had acquired its own momentum. On the other hand, the more
the lawyer was involved in continued nurturance of the group's existence, the more this special
duty to the members could persist as well.
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IV. THE TECHNIQUES OF GROUP CLIENT-CENTEREDNESS
A. Winning Members' Trust by Forging Lawyer-Client
"Communities"
A basic lesson of client-centered practice is that clients do not auto-
matically trust their lawyers, or communicate frankly and fully with
them. Such trust and cooperation must be won, because there are
strong reasons for clients not to speak frankly to their lawyers. Cli-
ents may fear that revealing the truth will hurt their cases. Perhaps
more important, clients are people, and so they are interested in
obtaining their lawyers' approval; the more the facts or concerns of
the client's situation cast him in what he perceives as a bad light, the
less willing he will be to reveal them fully."" In individual client-cen-
tered practice, a central tool for overcoming these obstacles is the very
carefully nurtured attorney-client "community of two." Like lawyers
for individual clients, lawyers representing groups should certainly try
to win the group members' trust-but they will not be able to make
such free use of the "community of two."
Lawyers for individual clients address their clients' mistrust in a
number of ways. Such a lawyer promises her client confidentiality, a
promise that professional codes suggest is crucial to lawyer-client
communication, presumably because it will be taken to mitigate the
danger that the lawyer will use what she learns in a way that damages
the client.8 9 She speaks to this same danger further by assuring her
client of her desire to help (and then proceeding to act helpfully).9°
At the same time, she takes account of her client's emotional needs by
listening attentively, and by responding to what she hears with empa-
thy or nonjudgmental acceptance. 91 She also applauds her client's
efforts to provide information. 92 She may even, however unintention-
ally, give her client the sense that she actually approves of and con-
curs in the client's feelings and views. 93 Wielding these techniques
88 See generally Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 74, at 35-40 (identifying seven
"inhibitors" to open client communication).
89 See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.6 cmt.; Model Code, supra note 6, EC 4-1.
90 Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 74, at 22 ("repeatedly convey[ing] a desire to help" is
an attribute of client-centered practice).
91 Id. at 40-42, 52-61.
92 Id. at 43.
93 See Ellmann, supra note 74, at 737-39.
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and assurances, the lawyer seeks to build a community of two in
which the client feels safe, nurtured and vindicated.
Like lawyers representing individuals, the lawyer who represents
groups must also nurture her clients' trust. The lawyer for a group
can promise the members confidentiality-as a group. She can also
affirm her desire to help, applaud the group's working together, listen
attentively, and respond empathetically. But her use of these tech-
niques is subject to important constraints. So long as she meets with
the group members only as a group, the lawyer cannot forge exclusive
communities of two, because the other members of the group form a
constant and potentially competitive audience for her encounter with
any one of their number. The lawyer who responds to a client's
expression of strong feelings by saying emphatically "I certainly
understand how upset you feel" risks saying to the listening group
that she considers the contrary position of other members provocative
and even wrong.94 As a result, she may often have to temper the
empathetic responses that would be appropriate in individual repre-
sentation. The impact of this restraint on the individual to whom the
lawyer responds would be less potentially significant if the members of
the group were themselves conveying to each other the degree of
unhesitating support and acceptance that the lawyer can give to a sin-
gle client. Some group members, even some entire groups, may
behave this way-but surely most do not. The result can easily be
that even as the lawyer attempts to convey a measure of empathetic
regard for a group member who has voiced an unpopular opinion,
other members are offering much more confrontational responses.
The lawyer for a group may also face another barrier to her forma-
tion of communities of two-namely, the prior existence of another
community, with its own members and norms: the client group itself.
This community may be long established and firmly organized. Even
if its members are quite diffuse, however, and have actually been
brought together by the lawyer, a set of people who are capable of
coming together for some shared purpose are likely to find they have
much in common already-and are likely to create more. Moreover,
as much as the lawyer may want to serve this group, she will often not
be seen automatically as "one of us," for she may not share a culture,




a class, a gender, or a race with the bulk of the group's members.95
Members of the group may be far from eager to put their faith in her.
By contrast, the lawyer for an individual-even an individual with
whom the lawyer shares little by way of background-is much better
situated to generate this influential community of two. It is true, of
course, that each individual client is probably a member of a variety
of groups and communities outside the lawyer's office, and that many
clients may not readily trust a lawyer whom they consider an out-
sider. But even these clients may be deeply dependent on their law-
yers for advice, and may well be guided by norms of deference to the
powerful and prestigious, norms that counterbalance or outweigh
their feelings of suspicion. Perhaps most important, the lawyer deal-
ing with an individual client typically deals with him alone, and faces
no direct challenge to her efforts to mold their relationship. The law-
yer who attends a meeting of her client group is never more than one
of the contending (or cooperating) personalities on the scene.
The lawyer might respond to such barriers by meeting with individ-
ual group members outside the confines of group meetings. Doing so,
however, may be taken by some members as a sign that the lawyer is
trying to manipulate them and to undercut what they have done as a
group.9 6 Even in this setting, in any case, she cannot establish exclu-
sive communities of two. Legally, she owes a duty of loyalty to the
entity or to the other members (depending on the definition of the
client), which constrains her ability to promise confidentiality to the
individual with whom she speaks. Psychologically, she is constantly
in danger-in this individual's eyes, and in the eyes of the others-of
95 Or she may not share a political viewpoint. I have had the experience of acting on behalf
of a group of student radicals, with whose goals I sympathized but in whose methods I had not
joined. I and the other law school professors with whom I worked on this case must have
seemed painfully legalistic and conservative to many of these students, and we struggled to get
them to consider our advice.
96 The example of the estate lawyer's insistence on meeting separately with the wife before
completing work on a married couple's wills illustrates this risk. See supra notes 68-73 and
accompanying text. This is not to say, however, that meeting separately with individual group
members is always as problematic as I suggested it would have been in this example. Most
groups' members are not as tightly bound to each other as married couples are; in addition,
most meetings with individual group members need not entail the blunt separation of the
members at the lawyer's direction that the wills case featured, but instead can be more gently
integrated into a larger, ongoing process of interaction between the lawyer and the group.
Indeed, in such a sustained interaction it would be natural, perhaps inevitable, for the lawyer
sometimes to be in touch with individual members rather than with the group as a whole.
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entering unwittingly into an alliance with the individual with whom
she speaks or of seeming to want to do so.97 Unless she wants such an
alliance, she needs to be particularly careful not to imply that she
does. This may make it essential to hold comparable meetings with
the other members, and to make sure that everyone knows of the law-
yer's impartial distribution of her time.98 It may also make it essential
to tone down the degree of empathy that the lawyer offers to any one
group member, even outside the presence of the others, so as to limit
the danger that the recipient of the lawyer's empathy will report it to
his fellow members as alliance.
Even if the lawyer who relies on such nonexclusive communities of
two to elicit clients' thoughts manages to escape the danger of inad-
vertent partisanship, she runs another risk--of acquiring dominance
over the members. I have touched on this danger already, in criticiz-
ing the idea that the lawyer should try to determine her group client's
wishes by carefully interviewing and counseling each of the individual
members separately. The result of that, I suggested, would be to
diminish the group members' influence on each other, and enhance
the role of the lawyer.99 Even if the lawyer tries to use individual
sessions only as a buttress for later interaction and decision by the
members as a group, she may tacitly signal to the members that she is
not confident of their ability to decide fairly and wisely for them-
selves. The more the members come to depend on the lawyer as an
intermediary, the more they may concur in this assessment of their
own group processes.
The lawyer considering how prominent a role to play in the group's
interactions should take seriously this danger of inadvertently weak-
ening the group members' own sense of responsibility and capacity for
dealing with each other.1°° Nonetheless it must be emphasized that
the possibility of direct communication between the lawyer and indi-
vidual members may be essential to protecting those individuals. As
one lawyer put it:
97 Clinicians who supervise pairs of students face similar perils if they appear to assess one
team member in the course of a meeting with the other-a mistake I have made.
98 Such structures of complementary meetings with opposing parties are used in mediation.
See Crime and Justice Foundation, Mediation Training Manual 9-11 (1980) [hereinafter
Mediation Training Manual].
99 See supra text accompanying note 82.
100 This danger of lawyer dominance will be explored more fully in the following Section.
See infra notes 102-114 and accompanying text.
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[There are] some people who are just so beaten down that they are not
going to be taking part [in] any process, and we represent a lot of
people like that, who have been just through absolute hell time after
time, and have been through rotten tenants' associations, they've been
through rotten landlords and winters without heat, and this, that and
the other thing. Sometimes there are people who are just not going to
take part, who are not going to feel empowered, who are not going to
try to empower themselves, and I think that we can't have their opin-
ions and their voices be lost. So it's those people I really try to get
involved with on an individual basis. 10 1
This comment points to the members' individual needs; these needs
may be all the greater if the group's characteristic ways of functioning
pay little heed to the silent voices around the table.
In short, the lawyer for a group faces a painful dilemma in seeking
to build a community encompassing herself and her clients: the very
techniques that may be most effective in building such ties with indi-
vidual clients may damage her connection to the client group as a
whole. To some extent, as the discussion in this Section has reflected,
the lawyer can "split the difference," employing such tools as individ-
ualized expressions of empathy in somewhat muted, but hopefully still
efficacious, form. But to some extent the lawyer forging a relationship
with a group client will likely need to look to other, distinctively
group-focused, techniques to win her client's confidence. Among
these techniques, I suggest, will be the approaches delineated in the
Sections to come, approaches by which the lawyer can both enhance
the group's functioning so as to diminish the need for her special
intervention with particular members, and build her relationship with
the group so as to enjoy more latitude for intervention when it is
needed.
B. Identifying Relevant Considerations
The bond between lawyer and client fuels, and is fueled by, the
heart of client-centered counseling-the careful, even elaborate, pro-
cess in which lawyer and client work together to identify the relevant
considerations on which the decision should be based.1"2 This process
makes sense only if it is believed that people are prone to overlook or
101 Interview with Judith Whiting (Oct. 1, 1991) (transcript at 30, on file with the author).
102 See generally Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 74, at 287-308 (chapter on
"Implementing the Basic Counseling Approach").
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misjudge important issues bearing on their decisions, and that cor-
recting such errors is an essential predicate to their making decisions
that truly serve their own interests. Thus it may be surprising to rec-
ognize that it is both unwise and impossible to achieve as exhaustive a
compilation of the relevant considerations in a group context as in
individual counseling. Group discussions may produce more com-
plete assessments than any one individual and his lawyer could,
because the members' diverse perspectives will illuminate each others'
judgments. But these discussions will not be likely to elicit so many of
the particulars of the several members' perceptions and situations as
might be brought out during a meeting between a single client and his
lawyer. Nor will the lawyer, on whom both individual and group cli-
ents must rely for information about consequences beyond their
expertise, be able to speak to each uncertainty of each of the group's
members. There simply are too many perceptions, with too many
nuances, for such exhaustiveness to be achieved. The effort to achieve
this, in addition, might actually be counterproductive, for the multi-
plication of details could serve more to confuse than to clarify the
fundamental issues at stake.
Moreover, this is not simply a problem of sheer numbers. For a
consideration to achieve notice by the group, it does not need majority
concurrence, but it does need to attract attention in the inevitable
interpersonal patterns of recognition and approval that develop
within any group. These patterns need not be pernicious; on the con-
trary, it seems entirely proper for groups to accord respect to those of
their members who earn it. At the same time, however, such patterns
frequently do not foster free and equal participation by all members.
Some people will speak and not be heard; others will not talk; others
will orate at length.
None of this means that identifying relevant considerations should
be abandoned in group representation; this step is generally important
to the decisions of groups of people just as it is to the judgments of
individuals, and lawyers for groups should encourage their clients to
undertake it. But the lawyer's focus must shift in two respects. First,
the goal of discussion must now become the eliciting of the major
concerns in the group's thinking, rather than the detailed varia-
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tions.103 Much as a teacher hearing two students make related points
will assist the rest of the class by linking the two together into an
overarching point, so the lawyer for a group must digest, translate,
and summarize somewhat disparate comments into more coherent
themes. 1°4
Second, the lawyer must work to ensure that the considerations
brought out are those of all of the group's members, rather than only
those of a dominant few. In this effort, however, the lawyer must be
careful to work within the context of the group, so as to avoid trans-
forming her group client into a series of individual clients. Of course,
there are straightforward steps the lawyer can take to encourage some
people to participate more actively. The lawyer can, for example, say
at the start of the meeting that it is important for all members to
speak their minds and hear each other's views; she can make sure that
those who have raised their hands get a chance to speak, ask people
who have not raised their hands whether they have something to say,
and discourage talkative members from chiming in repeatedly before
others have spoken at all. She can arrange the chairs for the meeting
in a circle rather than in rows to facilitate freer discussion. The law-
yer may also find it helpful to talk with individual members outside
the group meetings, in order to get a better sense of their concerns and
be able to ensure that these members' views get aired. Perhaps the
103 The difference between group counseling and individual counseling on this score is
substantial, but not absolute. Even in individual counseling, the lawyer cannot expect to hear
every modulation of her client's thinking. Indeed, Binder, Bergman, and Price propose that
"the extent of the obligation to explore a decision with a client should be governed by the
following standard: In counseling clients, lawyers should provide clients with a reasonable
opportunity to identify and evaluate those alternatives and consequences that similarly-
situated clients usually find pivotal or pertinent." Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 74, at 275
(emphasis omitted). Robert Dinerstein argues that this standard does not adequately protect
clients' interest in autonomous decisionmaking, and suggests in its stead a duty to "ensur[e]
the client's substantial understanding of material consequences," Robert D. Dinerstein,
Clinical Texts and Contexts, Review Essay, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 697, 704-07 (1992) (emphasis
omitted) (reviewing Bastress & Harbaugh, supra note 73, and Lawyers as Counselors, supra
note 74), but even this obligation plainly would allow for some omissions. Nonetheless, the
task of identifying the pertinent or material issues with a group seems bound to call for more
limited attention to the details of each individual member's situation than a client-centered
lawyer would provide to those members one-on-one.
104 Carol Liebman noted the feasibility of such steps for me. These steps are especially
necessary if the people coming to a particular meeting have not been steadily involved, and so
on the one hand may lack information and on the other may have particular agendas of their
own that do not fit with the concerns on which the group is now focused (possibilities James
Liebman helped me identify).
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lawyer will also want to express her endorsement of the significance of
points raised by less influential group members, so as to add the
weight of her influence to that of the speakers. 05
These steps may seem innocuous enough. In fact, however, the
more the lawyer utilizes them the more she will be taking over leader-
ship of the particular meeting and perhaps of the group itself. The
lawyer becomes increasingly responsible for deciding who speaks in
the meeting; she also becomes increasingly involved in taking the
pulse of the members outside the meeting. These are leadership func-
tions, and the lawyer who takes them on fills a role that group mem-
bers otherwise might have played. They may also have controversial
implications, for the patterns of speech and silence within a group are
not accidents but rather the product of the interactions group mem-
bers have had with each other. The lawyer who helps a silenced
member to speak empowers him, but she may be undercutting some-
one else. The very steps that help the group to make decisions, and to
realize its autonomy, thus become sources of threat to its self-govern-
ance and its internal norms, both of which are also aspects of the
group's autonomy.
This dilemma can be eased where the lawyer is able to assist the
group's own leadership to open up the channels of communication.
10 6
105 Though such patterns of unequal influence among group members are hard to eradicate,
some groups are deeply committed to challenging them. One lawyer who represented such a
group, made up of women challenging employment discrimination, described how the
members worked to bring out each others' voices:
[A]t the [defendant's company] I can think of two clients, both of whom were incredibly
timid people, who had to be encouraged and carried along by the women's caucus in
work, and were encouraged to get up and speak at one meeting after another meeting,
only to the extent they could. And I remember an early meeting. They got up and said,
"Hello, my name is so-and-so, and I'm in the thus-and-so department and I'm really
going to try to hang in there because I think things are pretty bad." And they sat down.
But that's all they could do. And after every one [of] these meetings, the women who
were the leadership of the caucus would go over to those women and hug them and clap
them on the back.... They really were brought along by the group, and ultimately, I
suspect, for those women, what they got out of the litigation was this comradeship, this
sense of self, this developing sense of personal importance.
Interview with Harriet Rabb (Aug. 29, 1991) (transcript at 34-35, on file with the author).
I06 This was, in effect, how the lawyer quoted in supra note 105 characterized her work.
When I suggested that she herself must have contributed to her clients' commitment to helping
group members find their own voices, she responded:
Well. I did what the other women, what the women in the caucus would do .... [C]all
them, talk to them, pay attention to them, encourage them to speak, encourage them to
talk to others, quietly, in whatever way they could, in their own departments, about
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Assuming the leaders do speak for the group, and assuming the law-
yer can persuade them, without resort to manipulative or coercive
pressure, to take steps fostering wide participation, the steps they take
will enjoy a democratic imprimatur traceable to the group itself. As a
rule, such steps will probably be forthcoming, for few group members
will be likely to insist on the virtues of silencing some of their fellows.
Probably, however, there will also be exceptions to this rule-situa-
tions, for example, where the majority of group members are willing
(or eager) to control the group's decisionmaking with as little input as
possible from a minority segment that they see as hopelessly irrational
or disruptive. In some of these situations, the majority may even be
right!
In the most intractable of these situations, the conflict between
what will empower the group and what will empower particular
members within the group may be inescapable. This conflict is an
issue of ethics as well as of technique. I have defended the principle of
group representation on the ground that, in addition to giving expres-
sion to the potential values of group connection, such representation
also increases individuals' power over their lives and vindicates the
exercises of individual autonomy entailed in group membership.
Here, however, supporting the group undercuts the autonomy of cer-
tain individuals. Such conflicts are, I suspect, endemic to group rep-
resentation, on questions ranging from whether to draw out or
submerge a dissenting voice, to how to make an ultimate decision in
light of the conflicting preferences of the members. It is important,
therefore, to have a method of resolving these dilemmas.
Two such methods seem unacceptable. One alternative would sim-
ply, and automatically, favor individual autonomy over group needs
(or vice versa). That response, however, would be at least in tension
with the premise of this Article that both connection and autonomy
should be honored.107 Moreover, if the issue is framed simply as a
choice between the autonomy of one person and the autonomy of
many (the dissenting minority as against the group's dominant major-
ity), I do not understand why one person's autonomy is necessarily
what was going on and what were we trying to accomplish. It was really what the other
women were doing. I did [concur] in it. I did participate in it. But I didn't take
responsibility for it. They did it themselves.
Id. at 36.
107 See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
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more valuable than many people's, nor why the wishes of many
should always override the voice of a single individual.
A second alternative would escape the need to resolve these ques-
tions by giving the lawyer the prerogative to favor those group mem-
bers-be they in the majority or the minority-whose position the
lawyer feels is more just or more sensible. Although this rule is self-
evidently an authorization for lawyers' exercise of power over their
clients, it cannot be rejected simply on that ground. The reality is
that because legal services for disadvantaged people are so scarce,
lawyers have little alternative but to exercise substantial discretion in
choosing which cases they will take and which they will refuse.108
Certainly public interest lawyers regularly make decisions about the
objectives they will pursue, and decline to take cases not fitting those
objectives. 10 9 Such practices can also be regarded as exercises of
power over clients, who may be pressed to recast their grievances and
concerns to fit the lawyers' mold.
Even assuming that we generally accept the propriety of this sort of
pressure,110 however, that acceptance does not provide a sound
rationale for lawyers' intervention in the decisionmaking process of
their client groups so as to systematically favor those views they pre-
fer over those they dislike. Lawyers' decisions to refuse cases not to
their liking can be defended as expressions of the lawyers' own auton-
omy, and the resultant pressure on disadvantaged clients explained as
108 On the shortage of legal services, and the resultant need for lawyers' exercise of
discretion in choosing cases, see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. For discussion of
how this discretion should be exercised, see, e.g., Luban, supra note 1, at 293-391; Bellow &
Kettleson, supra note 10, at 342-62; Ellmann, supra note 11, at 170-89; Paul R. Tremblay,
Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 1101 (1990).
These writers' views are not identical, but all of us would accord lawyers considerable
authority to take or reject cases on the basis of the cases' impact not only on the client but on
the larger disadvantaged community. For a largely dissenting view on this score, see Marshall
J. Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L. Rev. 282 (1982)
(arguing, albeit not without qualification, that "a person cannot be rejected as a client because
of the comparative social utility of his case").
109 See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (solicitation on behalf of ACLU to challenge
sterilization of black women); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (NAACP solicitation of
school desegregation plaintiffs).
110 To say that some pressure is unavoidable is not to say that all such pressure is
acceptable. David Luban, for example, argues that unless lawyer and client are bound in
political comradeship the lawyer should not condition her representation of a client on the
client's agreement to abide by the lawyer's political priorities. Luban, supra note 1, at 337-40;
see infra note 132.
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a product of scarcity of legal services beyond the lawyers' power to
rectify-but interfering with the client's deliberative processes does
not fit easily with either of these defenses. If the lawyer is only pre-
pared to take a case on particular terms, she should say so, but she
should not then prevent those members of the client group who dis-
like those terms from having their say, or from having their views
counted in the group's ultimate decisions. The lawyer who acts in
these latter fashions is doing more than pressuring her clients; she is
preventing them from thinking through their response to her pres-
sure. I do not mean to argue that the lawyer must altogether abstain
from steps that shape her clients' decisionmaking in ways they might
not have chosen on their own.11 ' Interventions as blunt as silencing
or not counting the views of some group members, however, consti-
tute a drastic interference with those individuals' autonomy and with
the essence of democratic group association as well, and they should
rarely, if ever, be permissible.
Instead, I suggest a third alternative: that the lawyer should con-
sider herself responsible for assuring a baseline of democratic and par-
ticipative process within the group, but that beyond this baseline she
generally should not override the arrangements evolved by the group
itself. Concretely, in the context of identifying relevant considera-
tions, this baseline might require the lawyer to encourage silent mem-
bers, during the meeting, to speak their minds. If she felt that the
leaders of the meeting were systematically refusing to call on some
member, she might have to bring him into the discussion herself. But
she would not have a mandate to make the group's processes "per-
fect"; often her role would be only to suggest, and not to insist upon,
further refinements of the group members' ways of interacting.
Rarely, if ever, would she have the right simply to usurp the role of
the group's own leaders, for example by invoking her status as the
lawyer to justify taking over the chairing of the group's discussion.
This baseline leaves groups with broad, but not unlimited, discre-
tion to shape their own patterns of interaction. The breadth of the
discretion reflects the ambiguity of any effort to calculate what mix of
II1 On the contrary, I urge lawyers to guide their group clients' decisionmaking in various
ways, for example by assuring the baseline level of democracy and participation to which I
refer in the text below. Broadly speaking, the interventions that I urge are less destructive of
client choice, and better grounded in what are likely to be the clients' own democratic norms,
than the abrupt limitations on client voice that I disapprove here.
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group effectiveness and individual voice will maximize the autonomy
of the members or the value of the group to them. The limit on it
reflects the likelihood that incomplete debate and abrupt dismissal of
minority views will generally fail to produce decisions that serve any-
one's interests ideally. For the lawyer to act on this proposition is in a
sense simply to act on the democratic norms to which the group is
probably to some extent committed already.1 2 But if the lawyer's
insistence on a baseline of democracy goes beyond what the group can
be said to have consented to, her intervention might still be justifiable
as a relatively modest paternalistic intrusion, meant to protect the
group as a whole from the dangers of internal tyranny." 3 Perhaps
more fundamentally, this intervention can also be justified on the
basis of a proposition consistent with this Article's emphasis on the
values of both autonomy and connection: namely, that the lawyer is
responsible for securing some protection for individual autonomy
within the groups of which the individual is a part. For a person's
membership in groups from whose decisions he dissents to be an
expression of his individual autonomy or selfiood, he generally must,
at least, have an opportunity to be heard within the group's
councils. 
114
C. Choosing a Decisionmaking Process
As important as identifying the relevant considerations is, this inev-
itably incomplete effort does not play the same part in group judg-
ments as it does in individual decisionmaking. In the description of
client-centered counseling by David Binder, Paul Bergman, and
Susan Price, the central function of the lawyer is to help the client to
112 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
113 In suggesting that this intervention could be justified as a form of paternalism, I am
implicitly relying upon a "sliding scale" test of the justifiability of paternalism, in which a
relatively modest intervention, such as this one, can be justified on the basis of considerations
that would not support more drastic intrusions. For an examination of paternalistic rationales
for lawyers' manipulation of individual clients, see Ellmann, supra note 74, at 764-73; for an
extended discussion of legal paternalism, and the suggestion of stringent standards to govern it,
see David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wise. L. Rev. 454.
114 There are exceptions to this proposition, modest as it may seem, for not every group
does adhere, even half-heartedly, to democratic principles. Thus a lawyer who represented a
religious group seeking to protect its members' rights of free exercise in prison, for example,
would not be justified in pressing for participatory discussion by the group's members if they
believed that their leader spoke with a divine mandate. Those who voluntarily join such a
group have expressed their autonomy by accepting the group's limits upon it.
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arrive at a full identification of goals, of potential solutions, and of the
solutions' pluses and minuses. 115 Once the client has this information
at his fingertips, often in the physical form of a written list that the
lawyer compiled during the counseling, he often, or usually, can make
a decision quite straightforwardly. 16 In the case of groups, however,
the difficulties of assembling complete information are compounded
by the unlikelihood of ever securing unanimous agreement on the
proper make-up of the list of relevant considerations. People may dif-
fer over goals (or at least priorities among goals), over evaluations,
and even over the relevant underlying facts; an effort to secure agree-
ment on a decision by first securing agreement on all of the underlying
considerations may be doomed to failure. 
1 17
Even more important, the identification of the relevant considera-
tions does not automatically generate a decision. Often this is true
even with individual clients, who of course may suffer from doubt and
ambivalence that even a lengthy dissection of the relevant considera-
tions will not dispel.11 But with groups the problem is naturally
much greater, because even if each individual knows his or her mind
it remains necessary for the group to come to a collective decision. To
make a collective decision requires a collective decisionmaking
method, but there is no method that infallibly reflects yet does not
influence the preferences of the voters. This conclusion is suggested
by two quite different bodies of thought. One is social choice theory,
which argues that we must question the ability of any voting system
to reflect accurately the full complex of voter sentiments. 119 The
115 See Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 74, at 287-308.
116 See id. at 308, 347. Binder, Bergman, and Price recognize that some individual
decisionmaking processes "do not run quite so smoothly," id. at 347, and devote a chapter to
these bumpier cases. Id. at 347-61. Even so, their account may suggest that typical individual
decisionmaking is more straightforward than it is. See Dinerstein, supra note 103, at 715-16.
117 Thus in mediation it may be a serious mistake for the mediator to become entangled in
sorting out the facts of the parties' controversy, rather than helping them to sort out the
elements of a solution. See Mediation Training Manual, supra note 98, at 39-41.
118 Binder, Bergman, and Price discuss a number of techniques a lawyer can use with clients
who find it hard to make a decision even after the normal counseling process has run its
course. See Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 74, at 350-56.
119 See, e.g., Richard G. Niemi & William H. Riker, The Choice of Voting Systems, 234 Sci.
Am. 21 (June 1976). For an overview of social choice theory by two of its critics, see Pildes &
Anderson, supra note 81, at 2128-40.
Social choice theory seemingly supports a radical skepticism about the degree to which
collective, legislative decisions reflect legislators' sentiments. I have argued elsewhere that
such thoroughgoing skepticism is hard to square with the intuitive sense that over time
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other is the social psychology of groups, which presses us to recognize
that the process of interaction leading up to a decision will influence
the emotional attitudes of the group members towards each other,
and towards the alternatives of compromise and conflict.120
In this light, the selection of a method of decisionmaking is a chal-
lenging task. 121 Before the lawyer can undertake this task, however,
she faces a prior question: whether she, or the group itself, should
choose the method. This is a potential question in the counseling of
individual clients, a question that Binder and his colleagues appear to
answer by endorsing the lawyer's responsibility for designing a deci-
decisions of democratic legislatures do tend to reflect dominant sentiments. See Stephen
Ellmann, In a Time of Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa's State of Emergency 30
(1992). Moreover, legislatures do not actually exhibit the random unpredictability that could
be generated by decisionmaking processes whose relationship to underlying sentiments was
arbitrary. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
Va. L. Rev. 423, 429-30 (1988). It seems likely, in addition, that the difficulties of capturing
group members' sentiments in any given voting system can be ameliorated when the groups are
small enough to allow members to express their views in a variety of contexts besides the
formal vote.
Pildes and Anderson, however, offer an additional response to the challenge of social choice
theory, a response that makes a virtue of what surely are the potential guiding effects of
decisionmaking processes on results. They maintain that "social institutions, including
democratic ones, must play an active role in structuring individuals' preferences to enable
those preferences to rationally express the diverse values that individuals actually experience
and affirm." Pildes & Anderson, supra note 81, at 2142; see id. at 2176-83. Ultimately, they
urge the design of democratic institutions "to promote deliberative rationality," id. at 2193, in
which collective judgments emerge from a process of seeking "shared reasons for collective
action," id. at 2201. This enterprise echoes and seeks to give concrete shape to republican
aspirations, as the authors recognize. Id. at 2128 n.23. It also resembles this Article's
aspiration, which is to describe a lawyering role that will foster the democratic functioning of
client groups. In encouraging lawyers to assist groups in maintaining both collective purpose
and attention to individual views, my recommendations for group client-centeredness are
meant, like the suggestions of Pildes and Anderson, to affect group deliberations, and to do so
in accordance with judgments about the desirable shape of these group processes.
120 For a telling example of a meeting whose design was unwittingly calculated to generate
dissension and frustration rather than to foster agreement, see Rodney W. Napier & Matti K.
Gershenfeld, Groups: Theory and Experience 431-33 (4th ed. 1989), a book to which I am
indebted. (For a cogent argument-not couched in social-psychological terms-that the
choice of an electoral system can play a major part in harmonizing or accentuating ethnic
conflicts in entire societies, see Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa?:
Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society 163-66 (1991).)
121 Broadly speaking, "methods of decisionmaking" embrace not only voting systems (or
other devices for making final choices) but also the processes of discussion and reflection that
lead up to the actual decision. Thus, as we will see, even such a seemingly mundane step as the
effort to elicit the relevant considerations reflects a judgment about decisionmaking method-
and a potentially contestable one.
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sionmaking process.122 This answer risks breaching individual clients'
autonomous prerogative to decide how they will decide, for a client
might want to implement an impulsive decision, only to be stymied by
his lawyer's intention to take him through an extensive examination
of the relevant considerations first. Usually, however, clients are
probably quite ready to accept the wisdom of a considered process of
decisionmaking-if they are disposed to give any thought to the ques-
tion of process at all-and so the lawyer's adoption of the client-cen-
tered approach will meet with no objection from the client.
12 1
When the client is a group, however, the choice of decisionmaking
method cannot so routinely be made by the lawyer. One reason for
hesitation is the sheer uncertainty about what choice would be cor-
rect, but an equally serious problem is that the lawyer who makes this
choice is exercising a form of power over the group. Although this is
true in the case of individuals as well, the lawyer's intervention is
likely to be relatively more visible when the client is a group, because
the shaping of voting alternatives and selection of a voting system will
often be more notable events than the process of elucidating relevant
considerations that is the essence of the decisionmaking method with
an individual. Many clients surely take the appropriateness of an
exploration of pluses and minuses for granted; fewer might assume,
especially if disagreement were heated, that the selection of the right
group decisionmaking steps was self-evident. And the members of a
group would be particularly unlikely to make such an assumption if
they already had a decisionmaking structure in place or in mind.
122 Their stance is reflected in Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 74, at 359-61. See
Ellmann, supra note 74, at 750-53 (pointing out the pitfalls of this approach).
123 1 am inclined now to accept lawyers' efforts to engage even reluctant individual clients in
this decisionmaking process as justifiable. Cf. John K. Morris, Power and Responsibility
Among Lawyers and Clients: Comment on Ellmann's Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. Rev.
781, 807 (1987) (arguing that lawyers should structure client decisionmaking). Where the
lawyer persuades such a client of the wisdom of her preferred process by rational argument,
she has done no more than to carry out her obligation to advise her client. Even where she
trades on the authority and status of her role as lawyer enough to be fairly described as
engaged in a modest degree of paternalism, I would consider such a limited intrusion justified
by the likely benefit to the client, and by the possibility that the client's own initial preference
for a less deliberative process is the product of some form of impaired judgment-for example,
of emotional distress brought on by the very problem whose legal implications the client is
trying to address with the lawyer.
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With a group of this sort, the lawyer may be unable, as well as ill-
advised, to impose the decisionmaking structure of her choice.124
At the same time, the lawyer who wants to help her client group to
make decisions, and would prefer to have the group decide how its
decisions will be made, must recognize that group discussion of deci-
sionmaking method may be very difficult. The choices to be made
have the peculiar properties of being both important and obscure, for
method may determine results yet few people are experts on methods
of group decision. Both of these properties perhaps make such issues
potentially divisive and entangling as well; those who have seen
groups wrangling over procedural issues may be familiar with this
danger.
In addition, some of these choices may be particularly hard to dis-
cuss because their impact is subliminal. A lawyer cannot explore with
her client how she will phrase her interview questions about the
events that brought him to her office, because the choice of phrasing
affects the answers given and discussion of the choice would undercut
whatever effects the lawyer seeks through her phrasing.125 So, too, it
might be self-defeating to discuss with a fractious group whether to
arrange agenda items so as to give the group some experiences of suc-
cessfully handling issues together before they reached the most con-
124 Cultural variations in decisionmaking styles can be dramatic. Consider, for example, the
"Samoan Circle model, whose central feature is that it is leaderless," as described in Napier &
Gershenfeld, supra note 120, at 450. Adapted for use in an American room, this method has
the following features:
Seating is in concentric circles; an inner circle of five chairs is arranged around a
small round table. All verbal interaction takes place only at the table, and everyone has
access to the central five chairs. If all five chairs are filled and someone outside the
center wants to speak, that person stands and waits until another person gives up a seat
at the table and moves to another row. If some table seats are vacant, the person who
wishes to speak sits in the empty chair. The key element in this meeting style is the
participants' proximity to each other around the table. This proximity both increases
their personal relatedness and reduces the kind of verbal abuse often hurled around the
room when members remain distanced from each other.
Id. (In Samoa, "several days of feasting and drinking together may be expected before the
discussion begins." Id. at 449.) Decisionmaking methods can be changed, and one culture's
methods may be borrowed for use in another, as the Samoan Circle in fact has been borrowed
for use in the United States, but clients who are accustomed to this, or any other, method of
decisionmaking may neither welcome nor always profit from striking innovations generated by
their lawyer.
125 See Ellmann, supra note 74, at 742-43.
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troversial questions they faced. The very identification and
consideration of this strategy could undercut its effects.
There is no complete escape from these problems, but here, as in
the effort to open up opportunities for all members' participation in
the discussions that lead up to decisions, the lawyer will be wise to
place most of the responsibility for shaping decisionmaking methods
in the hands of the group's leaders. Sometimes these leaders are not
officially designated as such, and sometimes the lawyer may need to
encourage the group members to choose leaders (a choice that unfor-
tunately is itself potentially tainted by process flaws). 126 Once a group
has leaders, however, the group's success in achieving its objectives
(whatever they may be) depends in some measure on those leaders
being able to act skillfully rather than clumsily. 127 If choices of
agenda and of decisionmaking method must be made, fairly chosen
leaders are, in general, better positioned to make those choices in a
way that reflects the members' wishes and sensibilities than a lawyer
would be-provided the leaders know how to do this. And so the
lawyer's job would be, at least in the first instance, to work with the
group's leaders, helping them to identify the relevant choices and
offering her advice about what alternatives might be best. In empow-
ering the leadership, the lawyer buttresses the autonomy of the group
as a whole.
The obvious problem with this solution is that it may make the
lawyer the ally of leaders who are usurping power over their mem-
bers. a12  Indeed, the lawyer's moral responsibility may be even greater
126 One lawyer explained to me that in her representation of tenant groups one of her first
steps is to tell the group to pick leaders, with whom she will be able to work particularly
closely. Her practice has been to leave the process of selecting the leaders entirely up to the
group. Interview with Judith Whiting, supra note 101, at 5-6.
127 The leaders' success is important not only to the immediate achievement of objectives
but to the members' (including the leaders') growing sense of their own capacities for effective
action-an essential element in empowering the group and its members. In the words of a
lawyer with whom I spoke:
I just thought, if I looked tough and sounded tough and talked tough and could give a
.. . zesty kind of a speech, they'd go away thinking, "Damn! I'm glad that's our
lawyer!" And in a way it was empowering to have a lawyer you felt was the equal of the
other side's lawyer, but it would be better if they came from meetings thinking, "Damn!
We did that well ourselves!"
Interview with Harriet Rabb, supra note 105, at 29.
128 One lawyer described an incident with a trace of this flavor:
A couple of students met with three or four members of a client group, and they were
talking about how to get the tenants to do this or that, or to follow a particular course of
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than that, because she may have triggered the group's formal organi-
zation and its decision to name leaders. In the long run, the leaders'
abuse of power may destroy the group, but plainly its inimical effect
on the individual autonomy of the disempowered members is more
immediate. I suggest that here, as in the case of opening up channels
of communication, the client-centered lawyer's responsibility should
be to monitor the fairness of the group's decisionmaking processes,
and if need be to intervene on behalf of those who are becoming vic-
tims within the group itself. She might, for example, make plain to
each member of the group that she is always available to talk to any
one of them individually and in private. 12 9 Once alerted to a problem,
she might try to resolve it through persuasion of one sort or
another-for instance, by privately urging the leaders to adopt partic-
ular decisionmaking processes. But she would not attempt to chal-
lenge the power of the leadership directly (for example, by trying to
override the leaders' decisions in a meeting of the group as a whole, in
alliance with the dispossessed members), unless the methods the lead-
ers were using fell beneath a baseline threshold of democratic fairness.
Given the difficulty of crafting an objective standard for this thresh-
old, it might be that lawyers' touchstone should be their sense of
whether the group's leaders are deliberately aiming at the suppression
of a dissenting view.
A lawyer who does try to block the leadership's running of the
group might undercut the autonomy of the group-the ability of the
group as an entity to work its will-and so her conduct might seem
inconsistent with the acceptance of group representation on which
this discussion has been predicated. 130 To be sure, in some instances
there will be no such conflict at all. It deserves emphasis that if the
action that either the lawyers were suggesting or that the leadership knew was
appropriate, and the President [of the tenants' group] said, "Well, they won't listen to
me, but they would listen to Jewish guys in suits"; and of course the students were
Jewish guys in suits.
Interview with Barbara Schatz (Aug. 30, 1991) (transcript at 8-9, on file with the author). The
president's comment arguably invited the students to exercise power over the group-though
it may have stigmatized the students at the same time.
129 One lawyer quoted earlier gives the members of the groups she represents a message on
these lines. Interview with Judith Whiting, supra note 101, at 31, 35. She wants the individual
members to know "that though I'm representing the group, the group is composed of
individuals, and I'm representing each individual... and not, say, just the tenant leaders." Id.
at 34.
130 Such conduct surely will increase the lawyer's influence over the group and its members.
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group's leaders are trying to override the wishes of the majority of the
group's members, and the group embraces democratic values, then
challenging the leaders is entirely faithful to the autonomy of the
group as a whole.
Sometimes, however, the group's leaders may be giving voice to the
majority sentiments of the members, and then the conflict between
group autonomy and individual autonomy is more starkly posed. As
in the case of participation in discussion, so in the case of decision-
making itself, I suggest that respect for individual autonomy and self-
hood does justify limited intrusion on the autonomy of the group.
Where the group asserts its fidelity to the principle that each person
has an equal say in decisionmaking, but its leaders are attempting to
suppress the views of a minority, the lawyer should consider it her
duty to vindicate the principle of fair process even over the opposition
of the group's majority. 131
D. Encouraging Group Harmony Around Decisions
The lawyer who counsels an individual client wants to help that
client to make a decision that he can live with, both because such a
131 This principle will not hold, however, for at least some groups that do not claim to
embrace democratic values, because the autonomy and selfhood of the individual members of
these groups may not rest on having an equal say in decisionmaking. Religious groups may be
one such example, see supra note 114. The family might be another. Families are commonly
not governed on democratic lines; although this is not always cause for rejoicing, probably
most people approve of parents' efforts to exercise a benign rule over their growing children.
To challenge this parental authority would be a blow to the family's autonomy, and normally,
I suggest, an unjustifiable one. Thus, for example, a lawyer representing a homeless family
would be quite wrong to routinely challenge the parents' preferences for potential shelter
placements based on contrary wishes of the children, however articulate the children might be.
But she might well be justified in taking such steps where the parents' governance had
degenerated into neglect of the children's welfare. She might also be justified more generally in
pressing the parents to allow the children an opportunity to speak their minds.
On the other hand, there are likely to be cases in which a lawyer should argue for egalitarian
decisionmaking despite the group's disavowal of this ideal. So, for example, a lawyer
representing a married couple, both of whose members declared that a particular decision was
up to the husband because he was the "head of the family," might urge the spouses to see the
particular decision on which the lawyer has been consulted as one that should not be left up to
the husband alone. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 68-73 (discussing the example of a
married couple making their wills in circumstances perhaps reflecting the wife's domination by
her husband). But I do not think the lawyer could properly insist-in the absence of some
legal requirement of egalitarian decisionmaking-that the husband and wife accept her
preference for such equal voice unless she was prepared to deny that women in general, or this
wife in particular, could competently choose a marriage on such terms of inequality.
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decision will be better for him and because he will be less likely to
regret or revoke it later (events that may be disruptive for the lawyer
as well as the client). The client-centered lawyer who represents a
group should similarly seek to encourage a decision that will "sit
well" with the group as a whole. Decisions that the group can live
with promote the group's cohesion and strength. Hence they enhance
the autonomy of the group and, within limits, the autonomy of the
members. To some extent, groups may be able to take heart from
decisions over which the members were deeply divided, if every mem-
ber is persuaded that the process of decisionmaking was a fair one in
which he or she was heard and his or her views respectfully consid-
ered. Because many people may not be deeply moved by fair process
when they feel the wrong decision has been made, however, the law-
yer who seeks to foster group cohesion will also have good reason to
try to encourage broad substantive agreement among the members.
Yet the goal of encouraging agreement entails ethical problems, as an
examination of some techniques by which lawyers might achieve it
will reveal.
We might, first of all, consider the path to agreement as essentially
a form of negotiation. Negotiated settlements serve all parties' inter-
ests if what can be obtained in negotiation is better for each than what
he or she could obtain elsewhere. But the members of groups repre-
sented by public interest lawyers face a severe constraint on what they
can obtain elsewhere-namely, the unlikelihood that they could
obtain new counsel to represent them in a schismatic venture on their
own. They are, therefore, likely to be under considerable pressure to
find a solution within the parameters of continued membership in the
group. This is undoubtedly a restriction on the individual autonomy
of the members. This reality by itself, however, is no basis for law-
yers' not seeking consensus among the members of their client groups.
That poor and disadvantaged people rarely have wide choices of
counsel is indeed a blow to their autonomy, but it is not a blow struck
by the public interest bar. 132 This lack of choice is part of the grim
132 See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. Public interest lawyers can, however,
exploit their clients' lack of alternative counsel in ways for which the lawyers must bear
responsibility. The more a lawyer presses her clients to adopt priorities that she herself has set,
and the more clients yield to such pressure because they cannot escape it, the greater the cost
to their autonomy, whether as a group or as individuals. I will argue that there is nonetheless
room for lawyers to urge their own views on the groups that they represent, see infra notes
1154 [Vol. 78:1103
Client-Centeredness Multiplied
truth of such clients' social position, and is one reason why collective
representation is appropriate in these cases. That the members of
groups needing collective representation are also constrained by it is
simply unavoidable.
The process by which the "negotiating" members find common
ground, however, is not simply one of rational exploration. Instead, it
also involves emotional orientation. The lawyer who wants to
encourage agreement among the members may devote much of her
effort to providing the members with a largely emotional reassurance
about the possibility of agreement. Her role thus begins to be that of a
mediator, and it is useful to consider some of the steps that mediators
may take to help disputing parties to find common ground.13 For
example, one mediation manual advises:
From the very outset of the private sessions, the mediator needs to stress
positive aspects of the negotiations and reassure the disputants. Most
basically, stressing the positive involves the mediator manifesting
optimism about the likelihood of reaching an agreement. A casual
comment to each disputant might stress the fact that both parties
seem like reasonable people who are sincere about resolving the situa-
tion. It is also a good idea for the mediator to review points with each
disputant where there seems to be a basis of agreement. Even in the
most difficult dispute, such common ground can be found. After all,
both parties agreed that mediation might be a good idea.... A cen-
tral aim of the mediator is to create a constructive momentum toward
agreement. As the mediator shuttles from one private session to
another, (s)he should diplomatically comment that the other dispu-
tant is also sincerely working hard at building an agreement and
hopes that further conflict may be averted.
134
149-63 and accompanying text. In the present Section, however, I am concerned only with
lawyers' efforts to assist the members of client groups to bridge the gaps between the various
views of the members themselves-a task in which the danger to the members' autonomy is
somewhat mitigated precisely because no injection of any third party's preferences is involved.
133 Barbara Schatz and Carol Liebman called my attention to the relevance of mediation
techniques.
134 See Mediation Training Manual, supra note 98, at 38. Later,
[a]s points of agreement begin to come out . . . [the mediator] should also keep
reviewing these. When reviewing areas of agreement, the mediator should stress how
these represent the positive fruits of each disputant's hard work. Stressing the positive




Besides encouraging each party about the other, and about the pro-
gress being made, the mediator may also find it helpful to reassure
each disputing party about himself (and, implicitly, about the media-
tor's positive attitude towards him). Thus, according to the same
manual:
Reassurance is a technique, which if exercised skillfully, contributes
significantly towards the momentum to settle. The mediator should
compliment each disputant's sincerity, reasonableness and patience.
A disputant should also be complimented on his/her good judgment
at deciding to participate in the mediation process.... A disputant
should be reassured at times when it may help to soften a position or
as positive reinforcement to a positive decision.
135
Techniques such as these obviously rely heavily on the impact of
what the mediator or lawyer says to the disputing parties. Strong
incentives towards agreement may also be generated without explicit
exhortations, if the decisionmaking process is shaped so as to bring
people together rather than pushing them apart. Parliamentarians
may be dismayed to encounter the suggestion that Robert's Rules of
Order, because they are "based on debate," embody a "constant ten-
dency toward polarization." 13 6 So, too, decisions based on simple
majority voting may leave a large minority feeling that it has been the
victim of "control and manipulation by the majority." 137 A decision-
making approach meant to encourage agreement might take quite a
different form, as in this scheme for resolving an issue dividing a uni-
versity department's faculty:
State the problem and a history of the issue to this point in time.
Next, reach agreement that at the following departmental meeting a
decision would be made that would be tried for six months and then
reopened for discussion. Define the condition that a 60 percent vote
would be required to change the present system. Randomly create
some groups of three or four and give each group 20 minutes to
develop two alternatives to the present situation. After 20 minutes,
combine the six groups into three groups of six and ask each to nego-
135 Id. at 38. The manual also suggests that "[s]ometimes such comments should be made
even though a disputant does not completely deserve them." Id. This suggestion is plainly
manipulative, though it may be justifiable, for example on the ground that it is a necessary
element of psychological support to someone otherwise emotionally disabled by the stress of
the dispute.
136 See Napier & Gershenfeld, supra note 120, at 360.
137 Id. at 353.
1156 [Vol. 78:1103
Client-Centeredness Multiplied
tiate a single best solution in 30 minutes. Then ask a member of each
group to present the idea of his or her group to the total group. Ask
the members to discuss these ideas during the period between meet-
ings (one assumes considerable discussion would ensue) and take a
vote at the beginning of the next meeting. If the group cannot reach a
60 percent majority at that time, discuss the two favorites for a lim-
ited amount of time. If a 60 percent vote cannot be attained, then use
the system presently in vogue for a period of six months.
138
All of these processes share a common focus on putting the parties
in the right frame of mind for agreement. They all share, too, the
potential that they will so powerfully affect the parties' feelings as to
generate agreements that the disputants would not have entered into
if they had not been filled with the spirit of the moment. Moreover,
although these steps are not covert they do seem to tap into aspects of
people's feelings-their need for recognition or reassurance, their
desire to please and to get along with each other-that are not
entirely conscious and are therefore particularly hard to resist. In
short, these techniques seem to put the individual autonomy of the
disputing members in jeopardy, by subjecting them to blandishments
and processes designed to ease them into agreement.
If violations of individual autonomy could be justified simply on the
grounds that group autonomy took precedence, these techniques'
impact on individual autonomy might be of little consequence, but I
have rejected any such automatic favoring of group over individual
concerns. Nonetheless I suggest that lawyers can be justified in urg-
ing the groups they represent to follow such processes. They may be
justified, first, on the basis of consent from the group's leaders or
members. Such consent may be express. When lawyers urge groups
to proceed in such ways they can, and should, make clear that the
methods they propose are designed to encourage people to come to
agreement if they can. After such an explanation, the leaders of a
group (or its members) might give a specific consent to particular
steps, or they might give a general approval to the idea of trying to
foster agreement, an approval which could reasonably be seen as con-
sent to some range of particular steps meant to provide such encour-
agement. Moreover, people who join a group usually do so with some
desire for the harmony of the group they are entering. Group mem-
138 Id. at 435.
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bership itself may therefore be taken as signalling some degree of
implicit consent to steps that will help the group to stay together.
Neither of these consent arguments, however, is entirely satisfying,
because the lawyer may not be able to explain some of the techniques
that she will use without defusing their effects. 139 She could hardly
announce in advance, for example, that she would be complimenting
the disputing members when she felt that doing so would encourage
them to make new concessions. Nor can it be assumed that group
members take for granted that their lawyers will try to hold the
groups together in these ways. To be sure, the lawyer might be able to
make full disclosure to the group's leaders, and win authorization
from them for the approach she will take with the group as a whole-
but the leaders' authority to subject their members to manipulation
may well be questioned, and in some cases the leaders themselves may
be embroiled in the very disagreement the lawyer hopes to ease. If the
justification for such methods turned solely on consent, therefore,
lawyers might often have to forego, or at least curtail, their use of
certain potentially valuable tools.
We are left, therefore, with the question of whether the intrusions
on individual autonomy that consent does not dispel can be justified
by the enhancement of the group as a whole. I have argued that such
justification cannot be automatic; it can, however, be contingent. In
some circumstances, that is, a gain for the group as a whole can justify
a paternalistic interference with the autonomy of its members. This is
a potentially pernicious argument, susceptible to immense abuse, yet
it is hard to deny that sustaining the group can in some circumstances
benefit even its more reluctant members.
Accordingly, lawyers contemplating the use of such techniques
must make a judgment about their impact, a judgment that takes into
account the damage that may be done to individual autonomy and the
benefit that may accrue to the group as a whole. This judgment
would, I suggest, often favor the use of these techniques. Relatively
intractable disagreements may both grow out of and fuel strong emo-
tions that distort the members' own assessments of whether, and how,
to restore harmony-even though the members remain presumptively
139 She might also use these very techniques in the process of gaining group consent to her
further use of them! So, for instance, she might compliment the group's members on their
desire to reach a harmonious decision in order to encourage them to adopt a decision process
that would further press them towards agreement.
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competent adult decisionmakers. Moreover, the violation of individ-
ual autonomy that these methods work seems relatively modest, espe-
cially given the partial consent that may also buttress their use. So,
too, the likelihood that requiring the members to give an informed
advance approval to certain techniques would undercut their efficacy
appears significant, and the value these techniques may bring poten-
tially substantial. 140
Sometimes, however, the balance of interests will lie the other way.
To make this balance the lawyer will need to look carefully, and as
objectively as she can, at the nature of the division of views within the
group. The more profoundly the group is divided, the less appropri-
ate it will be to keep the members together. The more feasible it
would be for each portion of the group to pursue its own views, again
the less appropriate it will be to impose a process that preserves unity.
And-last but not least-the lawyer should seek to gauge the mem-
bers' actual commitment to the group; the less it is, the less justifica-
tion she has for bolstering it subliminally.
141
E. Responding to the Group's Disunity
In a variety of ways, the steps of client-centered lawyering for
groups that I outline in this Article risk the diminution of dissenting
voices within client groups, whether because of interaction patterns or
voting systems that undervalue some members' contributions, because
of harmony-fostering techniques that seek to defuse disagreement, or
because of the persuasive impact of the partisan advice lawyers may
give. 142 I have also sought, however, to preserve for all group mem-
bers baseline protections of their individual autonomy. If this goal is
to be achieved, the client-centered lawyer must be prepared to recog-
nize and respond to those situations in which the group-supporting
techniques she normally uses may no longer be appropriate, because
the group has become so riven by disunity.
140 The conclusion that these factors demonstrate the propriety of modestly paternalistic
interventions by the lawyer relies on the "sliding scale" approach to paternalism that I have
already endorsed, see supra note 113.
141 Cf. Simon, supra note 12, at 481-82 (suggesting considerations that could justify keeping
a class together despite profound differences of view within the class).
142 I take up the impact and propriety of lawyers' advice in the following Section. See infra
notes 149-63 and accompanying text.
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The lawyer's task, therefore, is to distinguish between disagree-
ments in which all sides remain loyal to and integrated within the
group, and those in which the division is more profound. 143 Suppose
that a lawyer represents an African-American parents' group that has
brought long-running litigation challenging discrimination in the pub-
lic schools. 1" When the case began the members were quite firmly
committed to desegregation as the remedy for this discrimination, but
over the years some of the parents have come to believe that all-black
schools with adequate funding will provide a better education for
their children than desegregated schools to which the children will
have to be bused. For several months, the lawyer has sought to help
the parents find common ground around a program that would seek
some degree of both desegregation and enhancement of all-black
schools-but these efforts have failed. The members are divided, both
sides see the division as turning on a fundamental point of principle,
and the pro-enhancement parents see themselves as without a mean-
ingful voice in the decisions of the group, which remains dominated
by a pro-integration majority.
The lawyer's first duty should be to represent the position endorsed
by the organization, rather than to withdraw from the case altogether.
Acting under Model Rule 1.13, the lawyer for a group represents it as
an entity rather than its members as individuals, and so the split
among the members does not put her in the untenable situation of
representing clients with conflicting interests. She does not, and never
did, represent the members who now take issue with the organiza-
tion's position. 45 That is the view of the Model Rules; it is also in
143 A separate form of disunity would arise if some minority faction within the group were
in effect to stage a coup. In that ease, as I have already suggested, see supra text following note
130, the lawyer loyal to the group should be disloyal to the usurpers of power within it, and
should act in concert with the other members to try to restore their role in the group's affairs.
The lawyer's duty in such a situation might be analogous to the responsibility of a corporate
lawyer who becomes aware that a self-dealing group of directors has taken over control of the
corporation.
144 This is a well-known example of possible intra-group conflict. See generally Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 Yale L.L 470 (1976) (suggesting that lawyers committed to integration do not
truly speak for the black community, many of whose members see pressing for integration as
fruitless); Simon, supra note 12, at 481-82 (contending that conflicts among black parents over
the desirability of integration might be better satisfied through "intraclass resolution" than
through separate representation for parents of different views).
145 See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
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general an appropriate consequence of valuing the representation of
people in groups, when-as here-the bulk of the members adhere to
the group's position, and they control the organization by fair means
rather than foul. To bar the lawyer from continuing to represent the
group when its members are severely at odds with each other would
make the representation of groups as groups a constantly endangered
undertaking, and could profoundly impair such bodies' ability to sur-
vive the inevitable risk of schism.
But the group originally consisted of both the majority members
and the minority, and the dissenters' autonomy is now in peril: they
are an alienated, and seemingly voiceless, minority within the larger
group. I suggest that the lawyer has some duty to help them get their
voices heard if they so desire. In particular, this means that the law-
yer should ask them whether they want to pursue on their own the
issue over which they have argued with the majority, and if they do,
the lawyer should advise them to get counsel. 14
This responsibility is less modest than it may seem, because embed-
ded within it is a further task: the lawyer must judge when a part of
the group she represents should be asked whether they want to sepa-
rate. Raising this possibility may contribute to making it a reality,
and the lawyer who represents a group cannot ordinarily be under a
duty to encourage its break-up. It is only when unity becomes impos-
sible or improper, in light of the feelings and interests at stake, that
the lawyer has a duty to recognize the group's fission and help the
dissenters to take their leave.
Until then, the lawyer for a group serves her client well if she helps
it to stay whole. Even after the members of the group have developed
an unbridgeable difference of views the lawyer can often appropriately
urge both sides not to consider this a ground for divorce. Thus it is
easy to envision the lawyer for the group meeting with its angry
146 Under Model Rule 4.3, the minority members are, strictly speaking, unrepresented
persons, to whom the lawyer may, but apparently need not, give this advice. See Model Rules,
supra note 7, Rule 4.3 and cmt.; see also Model Code, supra note 6, DR 7-104(A)(2)
(forbidding counsel to give any advice, other than the advice to secure counsel, to an
unrepresented person whose interests may conflict with the interests of the lawyer's client). If
the lawyer were representing a class of black parents, rather than an organization, she might
have a similar responsibility to call to the attention of the court the existence of a substantial
dissenting group, potentially a subclass, within the class. See Rhode, supra note 19, at 1205




minority, and urging them not to abandon the group but instead to
maintain its collective strength while hoping to win the policy fight
another day. In the course of such a discussion, she might even raise
the possibility of separation as a way to help prevent it from becoming
a reality, for she could hope that as the members of the dissenting
group contemplated the implications of their position they might
recoil from it.
The lawyer's responsibility to help irreconcilable dissenters to
depart is, then, the counterpart of her responsibility to help other dis-
senters to reconcile. What she says may determine which category
the dissenters ultimately fall into. She may attempt to persuade, yet
she must be sensitive to the dissenters' right to choose their own
course, and even as she speaks she must judge her listeners' responses,
and try to gauge whether what she hears is an opening for further
persuasion or a gathering decision to divorce. In this effort, she is
likely to be biased in favor of the unity for which she argues, because
that unity is ordinarily in the interest of her group client. For this
very reason, I believe she must take care to listen attentively for the
signs of an alienation so great that for those who feel it departure is
the appropriate step. In doing so she can take into account the impor-
tance of the issue, the depth of the differences in views within the
group, and the intensity of feelings it has aroused. But the decision
will still be a judgment call, and a painfully difficult one.
If, in the end, the dissenters do leave and obtain separate counsel,
normally the lawyer should still continue to represent the group. To
require her to withdraw instead would deprive the group of knowl-
edgeable and familiar counsel, perhaps at precisely the time the group
needs her assistance most.147 In the context of the representation of
the relatively informal, democratic groups on which this Article
focuses, however, a relentless application of this principle might
sometimes aggravate the harm done by the split itself to the accom-
modation of individual and group interests. This danger seems real,
for example, if the split appears to be the product of dubiously demo-
cratic behavior on the part of the majority; if the group is almost
evenly divided; if continued representation would in the lawyer's
147 Again, Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.13 would appear to permit the lawyer to
remain on the case; indeed, under Rule 1.13, a lawyer for an entity client is so far shielded
from a duty to the entity's individual constituents that she can bring suit against a "former
constituent" on the entity's behalf. See supra note 45.
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judgment seriously damage the interests of the minority; and if con-
tinued representation would entail the lawyer's using information that
minority members gave her against the very people who provided it.
In some cases, considerations such as these may weigh so heavily that
the lawyer will have to withdraw-despite the immense blow to the
group that her withdrawal could strike.14
F. Advising the Group--and Allying with It
The guidelines offered in the preceding Sections have all been
meant to assist the lawyer in eliciting the views of the group's mem-
bers, and in dealing with the differences among the members that
emerge in that process. Their focus has been primarily procedural,
and certainly procedural issues are of great moment in group repre-
sentation. But a client-centered lawyer must address the substantive
choices before her client as well as the procedures to be used in mak-
ing those choices. Most prosaically, she must provide the client with
the information the client needs in order to make a decision based on
an accurate understanding of the available options and their likely
consequences. Somewhat more controversially, she may tell the client
what she thinks the client ought to do. Binder, Bergman, and Price
now accept-in my judgment, correctly-the propriety of the law-
yer's giving advice, and indeed take the view that "reject[ing] requests
for advice . ..demeans clients' ability to make independent judg-
ments." 149 Though they suggest that normally the lawyer should give
advice based on the client's values, discerned through the counseling
148 See Pope, supra note 86, at 39-43 (arguing that union counsel should frequently be
disqualified from representing the union or its officers in litigation claiming that the union has
departed from democratic principles of internal governance); cf. Hazard & Hodes, supra note
30, § 1.13:602 (corporation's lawyer may be unable to represent either the corporation or its
directors in derivative suits raising charges going beyond "a disagreement over business
judgment"). This is a terrible result, however, for groups that have little realistic chance of
obtaining alternative counsel. Perhaps in some cases less drastic remedies could be fashioned
(if need be, with amendments of the rules of ethics to authorize them); for example, if the
group and its dissenters seek different, but not inimical, objectives, counsel for the group might
be required to make available to the dissenters' counsel all information she gathered from any
members, majority or minority, prior to the split.
149 Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 74, at 279. See supra note 80 (on the treatment of
advice-giving by Binder and his colleagues). Such advice-giving should not generally be
prohibited even where the clients cannot retain alternative counsel if they dislike the advice
they hear-although lawyers in such circumstances should be closely attentive to the
possibility that their advice is not enhancing but undercutting their clients' autonomy.
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process, 150 they also affirm the propriety of the lawyer's expressing
her own moral or political perspective when she disagrees with the
client's intentions. 5 1 So, too, a client-centered lawyer for a group can
give advice based on the priorities the group has articulated during
her work with it, and she can speak based on values she holds but that
the group may not. But the implications of the advice-giving role
change in certain respects when the client is a group rather than an
individual.
First, the lawyer will often be unable to take a clearly defined set of
client values and give advice that simply applies those values to the
situation the client faces. To be sure, individual clients rarely present
their lawyer with entirely clear sets of values either, 52 and the lawyer
who tries to give advice based on the client's values may not so much
be telling the client what his values suggest he should do as helping
him to reflect further on just what his values are. Nevertheless the
lawyer's uncertainty about the client's values is often bound to be
greater with a group client, for a straightforward reason: the group is
unlikely to be unanimous about its values. In addition, because of the
multiplicity of individual sentiments within the group and the impos-
sibility of fully eliciting them, the lawyer often may not achieve as
precise a feel for whatever values the group does share as she can
attain when she deals with a single individual. As a result, the lawyer
may be unable to give advice of the form, "Since you feel this is an
important consideration, it makes sense to take this action." Instead,
her advice may need to be, "If you decide that this is an important
consideration, then this action makes sense." Sometimes she will
need to add, "But if you decide that another consideration is also
important, then a second course of action makes sense." Her advice,
in short, may have to be even more tentative than when she speaks
with an individual client, and the role of her advice frequently may be
more to inform further debate than to bring the client to a quick reso-
lution of uncertainty.
15o See id. at 279-80.
151 Id. at 282-84. For other endorsements of such moral advice, see Bastress & Harbaugh,
supra note 74, at 130, 334-38; Shaffer & Elkins, supra note 74, at 290-319. But cf. Robert D.
Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 501,
561-70 (1990) (urging careful limits on lawyers' advice-giving).
152 Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 74, at 264-65.
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Second, if a lawyer contemplates giving advice based on her own
values to a group, she must weigh against the benefit of her advice the
risk of contributing to the disunity of the group. As we have seen, the
lawyer for a group can have a special responsibility for promoting
group harmony around decisions, a concern that disappears in indi-
vidual representation. When the lawyer gives advice based on her
own values, she inevitably runs the risk of being seen as a partisan,
and very possibly also as an ally of one segment of the group against
others." 3 She may then be less able to win the conflicting members'
trust in a process, whether of mediation or of structured discussion,
that is meant to lead the members to see the logic of each others'
positions and find common ground among them. If agreement is
never achieved, moreover, the lawyer may have sacrificed some part
of her credit with the dissenters, and thus be less able to assist them in
their decision either to stay with the group or to abandon it. 154
Third, the lawyer who gives advice based on her own values when
the group itself does not share those values is not likely to see her
views prevail, at least unless she resorts to methods of persuasion that
are emotive, and sometimes manipulative, rather than merely rea-
soned. It may never be easy for a lawyer to persuade a client to follow
her values rather than his own. A group's values represent the conflu-
ence of many people's thinking, however, and may well be part of the
very foundation of the group's existence. The chances of the lawyer's
overcoming the group's contrary inclinations seem limited. It might
seem, in sum, that there is little to be gained, and much to be lost, by
lawyers who go beyond giving advice carefully keyed to the values of
the group members.
When a lawyer gives only this modest advice and bends her efforts
to promoting group harmony from a stance of neutrality, she is play-
ing a valuable role, but there is another, much more assertive, possible
part for the lawyer to take. If the lawyer who gives advice based on
153 This danger would exist if the group members disagreed over values; it would also exist
if the members were in some agreement about values, but were arguing over what their shared
values suggested they should do in the case at hand. The lawyer who expressed her view about
the implications of the group's values could easily become embroiled in the members' dispute
over that very question.
154 Although the dangers described in the text are distinctive to group representation, I do
not mean to say that lawyers' expression of their own views to individual clients is without
risk. For example, the client who hears his lawyer's views, and then rejects them, may resent
the lawyer or regret his decision not to take her advice--or both.
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her own values risks alienating or dividing the group, perhaps she can
partially overcome these dangers by showing the group members that
she in fact shares their core convictions. Then her supporting one
side rather than the other in an internal dispute might be couched in
the context of her fellowship with all of the members, and even her
arguing against a consensus of the group might be framed as an argu-
ment from a dependable ally rather than from a disengaged critic. To
be sure, this visibly shared commitment will not always be a way to
preserve credibility with the group's members. 155 Some groups will be
too divided for the lawyer to present herself as everyone's ally, and
some issues will be too divisive for disagreement not to be seen as
fundamental. In those cases, in fact, the lawyer's more active com-
mitment might even make her a more divisive force than someone
who, however irritating, was not seen as directly involved. But in
some groups, the more engaged the lawyer is, the greater the impact
she may make with her advice. 156
155 Certainly her expressions of shared commitment will not assist the lawyer if she cannot
make these statements themselves credible to her audience.
156 Perhaps this image of a lawyer-client alliance should be taken even further, to endorse
not just the lawyer's avowal of the beliefs she shares with the group but her decision to join the
group as a member herself. It is not hard to understand why lawyers, lke other people, might
wish to give such full play to their own beliefs and autonomy. In addition, such steps may
deepen the lawyer's bond with her clients; as one lawyer who was arrested with his friends and
clients has observed, "That I was willing to do the same thing they were willing to do broke
down some barriers in terms of trust .... " Creative Defenses in Civil Disobedience Cases,
supra note 72, at 106 (comments of Leo Goldstein). At least two colleagues with whom I've
discussed these ideas have told me of their own involvement, as members, in groups that they
wished to aid.
Nonetheless, I suggest that lawyers often should not become members of the groups they are
representing. To do so may interfere with the lawyer's ability to carry out courtroom tasks on
the client's behalf. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 3.7 (restricting occasions on which a
lawyer can act as an advocate at a trial in which she will also be a witness-as she might if she
was part of the underlying events). Outside of court, moreover, such full involvement risks
depriving the lawyer of the appearance, or reality, of objectivity that may be essential to her
playing the roles of facilitator, mediator, and monitor of group democracy that I outlined
earlier. The alliance I describe in the text is one in which the lawyer offers solidarity but
maintains a measure of professional distance at the same time; in many cases, I suggest that
this distance will enable the lawyer to provide more valuable legal assistance than she could if
she either erased or expanded the gap between herself and her clients.
I do not propose this guideline as an absolute rule. There may well be people who can shape
a role as members-cum-lawyers in which they are able to contribute the same sorts of group
process facilitation that I envisage more disengaged attorneys supplying-while also sharing
the full experience of membership in the group. There may also be groups in which the
lawyers maintain membership and hence solidarity, but are not expected to participate in the
activities of the group that they advise on, or defend, as lawyers. In addition, there may be
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This full moral engagement between the lawyer and her client
group, however, constitutes a relationship quite different from the
characteristic client-centered interaction. In individual client-cen-
tered practice, perhaps the central emotional bond between lawyer
and client is forged through the lawyer's empathy. Empathy, as
Binder, Bergman, and Price characterize it, is the lawyer's nonjudg-
mental understanding and acceptance of the client. 157 Empathy can be
a powerful emotion, but it is a bounded one. In theory, at least, the
lawyer who displays empathy does not offer actual approval of her
client's feelings or beliefs, for such approval would be a form of judg-
ment.15 Much as clients might respond to positive judgments from
their lawyers, a focus on the centrality of empathy seems to weigh
against the client-centered lawyer's expression of such approving eval-
uations. 1 9 There is, indeed, good reason for lawyers to be wary of
endorsing what their clients say, for the more a lawyer endorses any
particular aspect of what the client tells her, the less the client will feel
free to reveal other, inconsistent aspects of himself. If the client
comes under such constraint, neither he nor his lawyer may be able to
identify fully the real considerations facing the client, and so his deci-
sions may be warped by the lawyer's approval. The lawyer who
wants her clients to recognize that she shares their central values,
however, must convey, explicitly or implicitly, just such endorsement
or approval. Nothing less will express the sharing that she means to
manifest.
groups who will only trust lawyers who forego professional distance, and for whom a lawyer
from within their own ranks may therefore play an essential role. (I appreciate the comments
of participants in the New England clinical teachers workshop on these concerns.)
157 Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 74, at 40-42.
158 Binder, Bergman, and Price make clear that in their view even approving, judgmental
responses are not empathetic. See id. at 60-61. The line between understanding and approval
can be an indistinct one, however, and in practice, if not in theory, empathetic understanding
may well shade into implicit approval. I explore this and related issues further in Stephen
Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 Hastings L.J. 991 (1992).
159 Binder, Bergman, and Price do endorse approval, or "recognition," of the client's efforts
to communicate with the lawyer, see Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 74, at 43, but this
form of approval has nothing directly to do with endorsement of what the client wants or
believes. The emphasis Binder and his colleagues place on empathy, and the absence of
comparable encouragement of the use of approval, suggest that these writers believe that
client-centered lawyers should normally refrain from employing the latter technique. Bastress
& Harbaugh, supra note 73, offer more, but still limited, room for approval. See id. at 189.
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In many situations, moreover, clients will insist on such commit-
ment from the lawyer as a tacit condition of retaining her at all. It is
inconceivable, for example, that a group of black parents pressing a
school desegregation case would happily entrust their cause to a law-
yer who did not consider segregation a profound injustice.160 A law-
yer who expressed understanding of the parents' position, but never
manifested her agreement with their fundamental grievance against
the state, would also be more likely to receive the parents' suspicion
and anger than their confidence. It seems plausible to generalize that
the more a group understands itself as oppressed, and the more it sees
its legal efforts as meant to challenge that oppression, the more it will
seek such assurance of solidarity from its lawyer.
1 61
This moral or political alliance between lawyer and client is a
potent force. It may well give the lawyer a credibility that melds
together the expertise of the professional and the intimacy of the
friend. The lawyer who acquires such credibility with her client
group is in a position to influence her clients dramatically, a prospect
fraught with potential and with danger. The potential is that the law-
yer can inspire her clients to engage in a process of political mobiliza-
tion. The danger is that the lawyer can mobilize demagogically or
manipulatively. If lawyers could avoid forming such close alliances,
they might be wise to do so in order to escape this risk of demagogu-
ery, even at the cost of sacrificing the special potential for benign
influence that this solidary relationship with client groups can give
them. This would be a great sacrifice, for helping disadvantaged
groups to find, and amplify, their political voice is a valuable step
160 A lawyer who has done such cases confirmed this suggestion. He commented that:
when it comes to representing the Black community in matters of discrimination, it's
just impossible to imagine the lack of that sense from the clients-that sense being that
there was injustice here-and I think that attorneys who don't convey that sense will
have trouble, would have a lot of trouble with the community.
Interview with James Liebman (Sept. 17, 1991) (transcript at 38, on file with the author).
161 1 examine more fully the functions that expressions of approval can serve in lawyer-
client relations in Ellmann, supra note 158. A number of the considerations that support the
lawyer's explicit expression of agreement with her clients' values in group representation will
also apply to individual representation. See id. As already discussed, however, the lawyer for
a group cannot make as ready use of the empathetic community of two as can the lawyer for
an individual client, see supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text. It seems likely, therefore,
that the group's lawyer will have greater call to resort to direct approval in trying to forge a
bond with her client than would a comparable lawyer for an individual client.
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indeed.162 But in any event this choice is probably not open to law-
yers, regardless of whether they wish it were, for, as I have already
suggested, clients are often likely to insist on entering into such an
alliance with their lawyers.
Such lawyers might still try to escape the danger of manipulating
their clients by refraining from giving advice based on their own val-
ues. But this solution seems untenable as well. The lawyer who
believes in school desegregation is unlikely to be neutral in a discus-
sion of whether to settle a desegregation case by integrating the
schools or by enhancing the funding to still segregated, black schools.
For her to attempt to give neutral counsel would not be true to her-
self, and so would be a denial of her own autonomy. It might also be
psychologically impossible for the lawyer, and even if she managed
the feat, its falsity might be so palpable as to undercut her relationship
with her clients. Indeed, clients who accept their lawyer as their ally
in the perilous seas of politics may well invite the lawyer to push and
challenge them, as we may invite our friends and family to pressure us
without necessarily seeing our autonomy as diminished; 163 but as with
friends and family, so with lawyers, the line between invited sugges-
tion and unsought interference may be easily crossed.
The lawyer-ally acquires as a result a particularly challenging obli-
gation: an obligation of constant vigilance against her own overreach-
ing. The lawyer's influence is too great for her to expect complete
success in this self-scrutiny, but that does not mean the effort is to no
avail. On the contrary, there are many manipulative steps that law-
yers surely can refrain from taking. The lawyer who believed she had
no obligation to respect her clients' autonomy, and sought only to
press the political causes in which she believed, might advise her cli-
ent groups in speeches using all the rhetorical maneuvers of a closing
162 1 will return to the lawyer's mobilizing role in Part V of this Article.
163 Stephen Pepper has argued that lawyers should not be granted the power to pressure
their clients as the clients' spouses or friends properly could, on the ground that "[tihe lawyer,
unlike the spouse or friend, is part of the formal system of law imposed by the community."
Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res.
J. 657, 665. The lawyer who visibly shares crucial commitments with her clients, however,
might be said to have acquired an informal, personal connection with them, and a concomitant
right (or invitation) to bring greater pressure to bear. But we should be careful not to overstate
the extent of this bond or its corollary authorization of influence. Cf. Ellmann, supra note 11,




argument to a jury. She might incite her clients towards avoidable
courtroom confrontations with the thought that provoking the judge
into punitive behavior would reveal to the clients the true corruption
of the legal system, or would reveal this reality to other members of
the clients' community (at the clients' expense). No doubt the range
of blatantly manipulative or coercive steps a Machiavellian lawyer-
politician could take is vast. All of this a lawyer who seeks both to
ally with her clients and to adhere to client-centered principles can
avoid-and hopefully more.
V. CONCLUSION: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND COLLECTIVE
MOBILIZATION
The guidelines for group elient-centeredness in the foregoing Part
are meant in large measure to encourage lawyering behavior that fos-
ters the organization, effectiveness and survival of client groups. It is
quite reasonable, however, to hope for even more-to hope that
groups of disadvantaged people might grow into spearheads of much
broader community activity. Political mobilization of disadvantaged
communities is a crucial goal, crucial both for the individual men and
women in those communities who find a voice through the process of
shared struggle and for their communities, for which such efforts may
win political victories that alter the broad relations between them and
the larger society. ' It is very tempting, therefore, to ask whether
lawyers can contribute to this process even more effectively if they
164 Important as the mobilization of disadvantaged communities is, it is not the only way
that political victories can be won on behalf of disadvantaged people. Lawyers may be able to
win such victories by lobbying and publicity that appeal primarily to those who wield
governmental power, or to relatively privileged social groups who can influence those in
government, rather than by mobilizing disadvantaged people directly. In doing such lobbying,
lawyers need not even have clients. Many class action lawsuits, similarly, may have won
significant changes benefiting the members of the class without significantly mobilizing the
class members in the process. On occasion, indeed, mobilization of the class members for
political action may be impossible; this would be the case in the many class actions brought on
behalf of people substantially unable to speak for themselves, such as the profoundly mentally
retarded. (At one time I represented the plaintiff class in such a case.) Class counsel may
sometimes be in tacit political alliance with at least some of those whom they have named as
defendants, and such alliances may be effective. (For example, plaintiffs' lawyers in mental
health cases might share with state mental health departments a desire to extract better
funding from elected officials.) But these alliances are not mobilizations of the plaintiff classes.
The strategy I focus on in the text is, therefore, only one of the options open to a lawyer
seeking to bring political pressure to bear on behalf of disadvantaged people.
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abandon some of the constraints of cient-centeredness. Much of
political life, after all, is vastly more manipulative than anything that
a client-centered lawyer might undertake; politics is the domain of the
rough-and-tumble, and sometimes of the demagogue.
I remain unpersuaded that allowing lawyers to borrow the norms of
politics in dealing with their clients is necessary for political
change.1 65 On the contrary, the norms of group cient-centeredness
appear to offer lawyers a pathway by which they can contribute to
community mobilization while still providing substantial protection
for the autonomy of the individual members of client groups. If these
guidelines have their desired effect, after all, they will foster not only
groups' survival but also their growth. Although it must be admitted
that undemocratic groups controlled by charismatic leaders may
enjoy even greater success (perhaps at a terrible price), groups that
make wise decisions through democratic processes and enjoy cohesive
memberships are well positioned to spread the ideas they espouse in
the larger communities of which they are a part. Client-centeredness
alone, therefore, is potentially a boon to the political mobilization of
client communities-the very large, very loosely organized collectivi-
ties within which the client groups we have been discussing are to be
found. The lawyer's impact can be particularly great, moreover,
when she joins with her client group in ideological agreement, and
then uses, hopefully with self-restraint, the new opportunities for
influence that this alliance gives her.
The lawyer wielding such influence can promote political mobiliza-
tion in a range of ways that do not flout, though they may well alter,
group members' autonomy. In doing so, she will be helping the mem-
bers to change, for political mobilization is a process of change. The
kinds of change involved, however, undoubtedly vary from person to
person. For some, who are ready to act but are not experienced in
doing so, the lawyer's role may simply be instructional. 6 6 With
others, who hesitate out of the self-doubt, apathy, and cynicism that
are the fruit of the very disadvantages that frame their position in
165 See Ellmann, supra note 11, at 177-79.
166 One lawyer discussed with me how she would handle a mass meeting of discrimination
victims who were potential participants in a class action. Rather than delivering a speech to
the group herself-as she might once have done-she would now work closely with the people
who had first become involved in the case and help them prepare to speak to the larger group.
Interview with Harriet Rabb, supra note 105, at 26-31.
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society, the lawyer may seek to instill in them-or better yet, to elicit
from them-the desire to act. Perhaps she will do this by exposing
them to catalyzing experiences-although she will always need to
scrutinize carefully the justifiability of immersing people in exper-
iences whose impact they do not fully understand in advance. 6 7 Per-
haps she will encourage them directly, by exhorting them, and there
will be room for some passion in her words to such group members-
room given to the lawyer by people who have accepted alliance with
her. But the danger of overdoing this rhetoric will always be present,
and there is much to be said for a less flamboyant, sustained interac-
tion between lawyer and client, in which the lawyer helps the mem-
167 To lead unknowing clients into avoidable courtroom confrontations in order to teach
them a radicalizing political lesson would, as I have already suggested, be an intolerable
intrusion on client autonomy. But not all efforts at consciousness-raising have such repellent
features. Consider, for example, a well-known instance of a "catalytic" practice, in which
Gary Bellow took the deposition of a farm worker housing camp's manager at a place where
the many plaintiffs (residents of the camp) could, and did, watch and work with Bellow in the
deposition. See Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 Yale L.J. 1069, 1087-88
(1970) (quoting Bellow). Seeing the camp manager forced to answer their questions was an
exciting and energizing experience for the tenants, and perhaps "increased their sense of
solidarity with each other and reduced their sense of vulnerability to their adversary." Simon,
supra note 12, at 483. As I now understand the events, Bellow discussed the tactic with the
clients in advance, but it seems quite likely that they did not then fully grasp what impact the
experience would have on them.
In an earlier article, I criticized this tactic (as I then understood it) as an intrusion on the
clients' autonomy, Ellmann, supra note 74, at 772-73, and so it may have been-although the
clients' inability to predict fully what they would experience is not in itself a breach of their
autonomy (people inevitably and repeatedly must make choices in such conditions of partial
ignorance). But my effort in this examination of group client-centeredness has been to describe
lawyering techniques that would protect both individual autonomy and group connection. In
the process I have argued for the justifiability of modest degrees of paternalistic intrusion by
lawyers seeking to guide the functioning of their group clients. It now seems to me that some
"consciousness-raising" tactics-though not all--can be justified on similar grounds, and that
this particular example, even viewed as a case of paternalism, may well be an instance of
appropriate mobilizing practice.
The justifiability of such lawyer paternalism must depend on the particular circumstances.
As always, lawyers should seek to minimize the extent of their interference with client
autonomy, for example by obtaining the informed consent of representative group leaders
before embarking on the tactic. So, too, lawyers should prefer tactics that do not entail
paternalism at all if these are available and comparably effective. Naturally, they should also
look closely at the extent of the potential benefits, as well as at the severity of any potential
harms. These considerations would inform a "sliding scale" analysis of the propriety of
particular interventions-an analysis that should not readily license such conduct, but that
might well authorize a measure of such action.
Members of the New England clinical teachers' workshop, and particularly Gary Bellow
himself, helped me to think through these issues.
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bers to find together their own ways of expressing themselves, and so
discover both abilities they did not know they possessed and desires
they had not dared to have.'68
The spectrum of lawyer roles in such change thus runs from mere
instruction in skills to participation in client self-revelation. It might
be argued that as the lawyer begins to play a role that goes beyond
informing her clients to transforming them, she has definitively
breached the boundaries of respect for client autonomy. But transfor-
mation is part of what happens in groups, and membership in groups
is a crucial part of our selfhood. We ought not to reject the possibility
of such transformation, nor of lawyers' participation in it. Instead,
we should seek to insure that the groups to which lawyers lend their
support are collectivities that respect and protect, as well as change,
their individual members. Groups of this sort may deserve to be
called republican, or dialogic, communities. The contours of group
client-centeredness sketched in this Article can therefore be seen as
the elements of bringing such ideal communities closer to life.
163 See generally Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on
Lawyering & Power, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 699 (describing such a process of collective self-
discovery and empowerment in a South African black community, and the various ways that
professionals can, and did, contribute to the community's efforts).
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